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REBOOTING CYBERTORT LAW
Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig*
Abstract: Cyberspace provides an ideal legal environment for tortfeasors and online
criminals because Internet Service Providers (ISPs) have no duty to mitigate harms caused by
ongoing torts, crimes, and infringing acts. Courts have stretched Congress's express language
in § 230 of the Communications Decency Act from the narrow purpose of immunizing ISPs
as publishers to the expanded purpose of shielding them from all tort liability. This Article
proposes imposing a limited duty of care on ISPs to remove or block ongoing tortious
activities on their services when they have been given actual notice. This reform will
harmonize American ISP liability law with the European Union's Electronic Commerce
Directive, which imposes an affirmative duty on ISPs to take down objectionable materials. It
also will unify U.S. law by creating procedures consistent with the takedown policy
mandated by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
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INTRODUCTION
Cyberspace offers unscrupulous people an entirely new venue in
which to conduct harmful activities without a significant chance of being
identified, let alone punished. In the first half of 2004, the most common
online frauds involved non-delivered merchandise, Nigerian money
offers,' "phishing" for personal data,2 and deceptive adult pornographic
1. Many variants of the Nigerian money swindle exist. One version involves an e-mail purporting
to be from a Nigerian banker offering the recipient the opportunity to earn hundreds of thousands of
dollars. Generally, the scarnster poses as a representative of a dead multimillionaire. "He says he
needs a foreign bank account through which to launder the money-and in return for sending him
your bank details for this purpose, he will give you a share of the spoils." Will Sturgeon, 'Nigerian'
Money Scam: What Happens When You Reply?, The Sparn Report, at
http://www.silicon.com/research/specialreports/thespamreport/0,39025001,10002928,00.htm (Feb.
18, 2003).
2. The Internet has spawned new consumer injuries such as "phishing":
In computing, phishing is the act of attempting to fraudulently acquire through deception
sensitive personal information such as passwords and credit card details by masquerading in an
official-looking email, IM [instant message], etc. as someone trustworthy with a real need for





To illustrate the prevalence of Internet fraud, one of the Authors
answered a Yahoo! advertisement that offered to sell a used 2001
Porsche Boxster for less than half its Kelley Blue Book value. The seller
provided no address, telephone number, or other information verifying
his identity. The fraudulent merchant attempted to bolster confidence by
agreeing to meet in person so the Authors could inspect the automobile.
Shortly before the scheduled meeting, the seller sent the following e-
mail:
sorry... but right now i'm not in the states. i urngent had to
leave because my wife is seak . she have a malformation to teh
heart and she needs a special operation in a specialised clinic in
France. i must tell you that if you have real intentions about the
car first you must make a deposit of 10% of the car price before
teh shipping. sorry but I need buyers with real intentions because
if i will not get the money for the operation in time my wife
could die. my intentions are to sell the car to the first buyer who
will make the deposit. if you are decided about buying the car
please send me your full name and addres so I can arrange the
shipping.4
The previous example is not an isolated occurrence. When one of the
Authors sent e-mails expressing interest in two different models of
Porsche automobiles on the Yahoo! website, the purported sellers
responded using similar language:
Thank you for your interest in my car. First of all, I want to tell
you that the vehicle is in perfect condition. The milage is
accurate. It has no scratches, no damages, no hidden defects.
Kept it in a warm garage. It comes with all the documents
needed for registration in US, it has a clear title issued in US and
it can be anytime registred into your name any time without a
problem so, I want you to stay cool about this. Also, the car will
1990s by crackers attempting to steal AOL accounts. An attacker would pose as an AOL staff
member and send an instant message to a potential victim. The message would ask the victim
to reveal his or her password, for instance to "verify your account" or to "confirm billing
information." Once the victim gave over the password, the attacker could access the victim's
account and use it for criminal purposes, such as spamming.
Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, Phishing, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing (last visited
March 28, 2005).
3. National Fraud Information Center, Internet Fraud Statistics: January to June 2004, at
http://www.fraud.org/janjune2004ifw.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
4. E-mail from Anonymous Seller to Michael L. Rustad (Aug. 20, 2004) (on file with authors).
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be delivered from Greece and I will take care of all shipping and
insurance charges. I made a couple of phone calls and the best
and fastest way I can ship the unit with DHL Air First door-to-
door and you received it between 3-5 days. I hate to sell it, but
after long discussions with my wife, we decided to invest the
money that we will get from this in our future business. The
price I hope to obtain for this beauty is $IOOOOUSD (this price
of course includes shipping and insurance charges).5
The second "seller" responded:
I will need first a deposit at Westen Union for $3000 so I can
take care of the shipping, handleing and custom fees so when the
car will get into US you wont have to pay a penny extra that the
balance due delivery. You can pay that to DHL with a certifyed
check and I will get the money from them.... As soon as the
package arrives, you will test the item and if it does not matches
100% to your expectations, you will return it in max. 15 days
since the arrival date. In this case I will send you the money
back and after you received your money back, you will send me
the car in the original crate and you don't have to pay the return
shipping and insurance. If you agree with this price we can start
the arrangements at this point. If you want to conclude this deal
on the phone please tell me and I will call you. My best wishes
and I'm waiting your response.6
As the old adage warns, "If it looks too good to be true, it is!"
Consumers filed more than 24,000 complaints against online swindlers
in the first six months of 2004. 7 These deceived consumers lost an
average of $843 per transaction with cyberspace fraudsters. 8 During this
same period, not a single online consumer received a monetary or
equitable remedy from any Internet Service Provider (ISP) 9 in a
5. E-mail from Anonymous Seller to Michael L. Rustad (Aug. 27, 2004) (on file with authors).
6. E-mail from Anonymous Seller to Michael L. Rustad (Aug. 21, 2004) (on file with authors).
7. National Fraud Information Center, supra note 3.
In the fall of 2003, eBay removed the link from its Web site to the National Consumers
League's fraud center. As a result, the number of auction complaints reported to NCL has
dropped to 1/6 of the previous level. Based on statistics prior to eBay's action, NCL estimates
that the fraud center would have received 18,660 auction complaints during the January ]-June
30, 2004 time period. The total number of Internet fraud complaints was projected at 24,505,
with auctions representing 76%.
Id.
8. Id.
9. Professors Ronald J. Mann and Jane K. Winn define the term "ISP" to subsume "a variety of
activities: from the wholly anonymous transmission of a backbone provider, to the wholly
Vol. 80:335, 2005
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cybertort lawsuit. A defrauded Internet consumer 10 has no recourse
against a website or Internet portal that hosts a fraudulent seller, even if
the intermediary had actual knowledge of ongoing cybercrimes.
Consequently, if a victim of the auto sales scheme had notified Yahoo!
of the pattern and practice of fraud on its online website, Yahoo! would
have had no duty to take the seller offline or even to warn consumers to
exercise caution when ordering goods from the seller.
Under current United States law, consumers are left without cybertort
remedies against ISPs, even though ISPs are generally in the best
position to mitigate damages from online fraudulent schemes, website
defamation, and other information-based torts by taking down
objectionable content. Congress expressly provided ISPs with protection
from online defamation claims for publisher's liability when it enacted
§ 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA). l l Congress
transmissive service that a commercial ISP provides to a domain like utexas.edu, to the partially
content-based activity that a provider like AOL, MSN, or Yahoo! provide to one of their
subscribers." RONALD J. MANN & JANE K. WINN, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 177 (2d ed. 2005). For
purposes of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, an Internet "service provider," or ISP, is "a
provider of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefore." 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(k)(1)(B) (2000).
In this Article, we define the term "ISP" broadly. We use the term ISP to refer to an "interactive
computer service" as defined by § 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA): any
"information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access
by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides
access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational
institutions." 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2000). The "interactive computer service" broadly encompasses
large-scale and small-scale service providers, search engines, websites, and many other online
intermediaries. Courts may define ISPs more narrowly as entities that "provide[]... subscribers
with access to the Internet. Such service providers include, for example, America Online, commonly
referred to as 'AOL,' and Earthlink, as well as numerous other providers." Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d
1018, 1028 n.12 (9th Cit. 2003).
10. For purposes of our study, the Authors defined "consumer" as an individual buying goods for
"personal, family, or household purposes." For example, the term "consumer debt" in the federal
bankruptcy statute is defined to include "debt incurred by an individual primarily for a personal,
family, or household purpose." 11 U.S.C. §101(8) (2000). "The definition [of consumer debt used in
the bankruptcy act] is adapted from the definition used in various consumer protection laws." H.R
REP. No. 95-595, at 309 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6266; S. REP. NO. 95-989, at
22 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5808. For example, the Authors' definition of
consumer is found in the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA). 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1) (2005) (defining
term "consumer product" to include "any tangible personal property which is distributed in
commerce and which is normally used for personal, family, or household purposes"). TILA's scope
is limited to "consumer" credit transactions, which are defined as transactions in which "the money,
property, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes." 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h) (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(p) (2004). Similarly, a
consumer transaction in cyberspace includes commercial transactions in which an individual
purchases goods or services online for personal, family, or household purposes.
11. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, title V, 110 Stat. 133, 133-143
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did not address the larger question of whether ISPs were also immunized
from online defamation liability when they act as mere distributors of
defamatory statements. U.S. courts have stretched the CDA to abolish
ISPs' common-law liability as distributors, even when ISPs know or
have reason to know of underlying defamatory content. 12 As a result,
online service providers enjoy total immunity from liability as both
distributors 3 and as publishers.14
(codified as amended at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). "No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider." 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2000). The primary goal of the CDA was to
control the exposure of minors to indecent material. See Communications Decency Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-104, title V, 110 Stat. 133, 133-143 (codified as amended at scattered sections of
47 U.S.C.); H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 81-91 (1996) (noting statutory purpose of protecting children
from being exposed to pornographic materials online); S. REP. No. 104-230, at 187-93 (1996)
(same); S. REP. No. 104-23, at 9 (1995) (same). Section 230 authorizes providers and users of
interactive computer services to remove or restrict access to inappropriate materials without being
classified as publishers. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
12. See infra Part II.
13. Distributors include conduits such as "telegraph and telephone companies, libraries and news
vendors." DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 402, at 1123 (2000). Distributors do not have
liability for content created by others unless "the distributor knows or should know of the
defamatory content in materials he distributes." Id. A bookstore owner, for example, would not be
liable for defamatory statements made in books the store sold absent actual knowledge. "ISPs and
other distributors of information (e.g., bookstores) only assume liability when they acquire
knowledge of the material they are handling." Brian C. Lewis, Note, Prevention of Computer Crime
Amidst International Anarchy, 41 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 1353, 1368 (2004) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230
(2000)). The common law rule makes a distributor liable where it has knowledge of the facts and
circumstances that are producing clearly libelous activity, but takes no action to remove the
material. See, e.g., Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
("[D]istributors of defamatory publications are not liable if they neither know nor have reason to
know of the defamation."), reversed on other grounds, Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., Inc., 745 F.2d
123 (2d Cir. 1984). The Restatement Second of Torts explains:
[A] news dealer is not liable for defamatory statements appearing in the newspapers or
magazines that he sells if he neither knows nor has reason to know of the defamatory article.
The dealer is under no duty to examine the various publications that he offers for sale to
ascertain whether they contain any defamatory items. Unless there are special circumstances
that should wam the dealer that a particular publication is defamatory, he is under no duty to
ascertain its innocent or defamatory character. On the other hand, when a dealer offers for sale
a particular paper or magazine that notoriously persists in printing scandalous items, the vendor
may do so at the risk that any particular issue may contain defamatory language.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 cmt. d (1977).
14. Section 230 federal immunity for service providers is far broader than that offered in
European countries. The United Kingdom, for example,
adapts the traditional innocent disseminator defence to the on-line environment. It does not
provide the carte blanche protection from liability that s. 230 of the American [CDA] does. An
ISP, which by virtue of s. 1(3) is not an author, editor, or publisher; that takes reasonable care,
having regard to the factors listed in s. 1(5); and does not know or have reason to believe that
what he did caused or contributed to the publication of a defamatory statement, will be
protected from liability for defamation.
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The judiciary's inflated interpretation of § 230 has created a legal
environment that is ideal for injury and difficult for redress. ISPs have
no obligation to remove tortious materials, to prevent the reposting of
objectionable materials, or to help victims track down the primary
wrongdoers. Consequently, cyberspace injuries resulting from online
stalking, defamatory messages posted to Internet newsgroups, dark-side
hackings, e-mail spain, online espionage, or the unleashing of destructive
computer viruses generally go unpunished by the civil law. Consumers
have the right to pursue primary wrongdoers through tort litigation, but
this is rarely a realistic option because the typical cybercriminal finds it
easy to default by disappearing to an unknown and unknowable foreign
venue. 15
In Does 1 Through 30 Inclusive v. Franco Productions, Inc., 16 for
example, a jury awarded more than $500 million in damages to a group
of college athletes who, while showering and in various stages of
undress, were secretly videotaped by pornographers who sold the tapes
on a website. 17 The plaintiffs have no significant hope of collecting this
award from the sellers of the videotapes because the defendants did not
appear in court and defaulted.1 8 The plaintiffs' appeal, therefore, was
only against the ISPs that had profited from the fees they received for
hosting the websites that sold the obscene materials.' 9 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed all claims against
these solvent web hosts, ruling that § 230 immunized these ISPs from all
liability. 20 The victimized athletes were thus left without any meaningful
legal recourse. Similar injustices can be redressed only by reducing the
judicially expanded broad immunity for online torts enjoyed by ISPs.
As in the industrial age, the common law of torts must now
Michael Deturbide, Liability of Internet Service Providers for Defamation in the US and Britain:
Same Competing Interests, Different Responses, J. INFO. L. & TECH., pt. 6.1 (Issue Three) (2000), at
http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/00-3/deturbide.html.
15. See, e.g., Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 656 (7th Cir. 2003) (describing how primary
wrongdoers defaulted or could not be located or served with process in Internet tort action).
16. 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8645 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 2000), affd sub nom. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347
F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003).
17. Id. at *14-16 (failing in attempt to breach service provider immunity in order to include
invasion of privacy action against web hosts selling objectionable online content).
18. GTE, 347 F.3d at 656.
19. Judge Easterbrook noted that there was little prospect of collecting from the primary
wrongdoer. Id. at 657.
20. Id. at 659.
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accommodate itself "to the changing thought and action of the times., 21
Internet tort remedies need to evolve beyond their current role of
protecting the interests of powerful Internet stakeholders so that the civil
law can respond to the new risks and dangers lurking on the World Wide
Web. The ideal Internet tort regime for the twenty-first century would be
highly adaptable and supremely flexible in order to punish and deter
those who commit online defamation, fraud, or other information torts.
America's tort regime has yet to achieve its potential as a defender of the
victims of cyberwrongs because absolute immunity permits ISPs to
behave irresponsibly without suffering any consequences.
This Article reconceptualizes the tort liability of online intermediaries
such as ISPs, websites, and search engines to help consumers redress
online injuries. 22 Part I draws upon a database of cyberspace cases to
show that, while cybertorts are developing to protect corporate interests,
the online consumer has little recourse in tort law.23 Thus, victims of
fraudulent online auctions and online sales, Nigerian money offers, fake
check scams, online privacy invasion, and a variety of other cyberspace
injuries have rights without effective remedies.
Part II traces the path of Internet law, focusing on the cybertort
liability of online intermediaries. Congress substantially altered the
cybertort landscape by enacting § 230 of the CDA. Congress intended
this section to shield ISPs from traditional publisher liability for content
supplied by third parties.24 Courts, however, have expanded § 230 far
21. 1 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS xxvi (3d ed. 1996) (describing how
common law of torts, property, and contract has historically been adaptable); see also Ezra Dodd
Church, Note, Technological Conservatism: How Information Technology Prevents the Law from
Changing, 83 TEX. L. REv. 561, 581-86 (2004) (explaining how software code and nature of
information technologies creates legal lag).
22. Search engines are "on-line tools used for finding Web sites .... There are two types of
search engines, namely, 'automated' search engines and search engines that rely upon people to
review and catalogue Web sites." Pablo Asbo Baistrocchi, Liability of Intermediary Service
Providers in the EU Directive on Electronic Commerce, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 111, 116 (2002).
23. We have updated our empirical study of litigation to include all Internet-related litigation
between January 1, 1992, and July 1, 2004, in which a prevailing plaintiff received either monetary
damages or equitable relief. For a fuller description of the methodology used to create the earlier
database, see generally Michael L. Rustad, Punitive Damages in Cyberspace: Where in the World Is
the Consumer?, 7 CHAPMAN L. REv. 39 (2004); Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig,
Cybertorts and Legal Lag: An Empirical Analysis, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 77 (2003).
24. Congress enacted § 230 to expressly overrule courts that would hold ISPs liable as publishers
for materials posted by third parties.
[Congress] worried that such a rule would deter a provider of an interactive computer service
from removing objectionable material from its services that are frequented by minors because
removing the material would subject the service provider to publisher liability. In response,
Vol. 80:335, 2005
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beyond Congress's original intent by immunizing ISPs and websites
from distributor liability and virtually every other tort action.25
Part III examines the injustice experienced by consumers who fail to
find any legal redress for injuries, losses, or damages that result from the
negligent or intentional acts of cybertortfeasors and cybercriminals. In
the vast majority of consumer injury cases, the injured party does not
even file a claim against the anonymous wrongdoers because they are
not locatable. The most critical issue is whether ISPs owe a duty to take
down objectionable content or to help their customers track down third-
party criminals. While ISPs are not insurers of their customers' safety,
they should have a duty to remove content that is known to be tortious or
criminal.
Part IV proposes that Congress scale back § 230's absolute immunity
for ISPs by reformulating online intermediary law to harmonize
elements from the common law of distributor liability, the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act's (DMCA) notice-and-takedown procedure,26
and the European Union's E-Commerce Directive. 7 Under our proposed
cybertort takedown policy, an ISP would not be liable for third-party
defamation until it received actual notice of objectionable content and
failed to take prompt remedial action to avoid further losses.28 This
Congress enacted 47 U.S.C. § 230 as part of the CDA.
Ryan W. King, Online Defamation: Bringing the Communications Decency Act of 1996 in Line with
Sound Public Policy, 2003 DuKE L. & TECH. REv. 0024, 4, at
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/PDF/2003DLTR0024.pdf.
25. See infra Part ll.B.
26. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. 105-304, § 202, 112 Stat. 2860, 2879-2881 (1998)
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2000)). The notice-and-takedown procedure is
described at 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
27. See Council Directive 2000/3 1/EC of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information
Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market ('Directive on
Electronic Commerce'), 2000 O.J. (L 178) [hereinafter E-Commerce Directive] (discussing certain
legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the internal
market of the European Community), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/1l178/17820000717en00010016.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2005). The E-
Commerce Directive harmonizes rules for all European countries for commercial communications,
electronic contracts, and limitations of liability of intermediary service providers. The European
Union (EU) is an international organization of European countries that forms common institutions.
Europa, The European Union at a Glance, at http://europa.eu.int/abc/indexen.htm (last visited Apr.
24, 2005). The EU's five major institutions are the European Parliament, Council of The European
Union, European Commission, Court of Justice, and Court of Auditors. Id. EU decisions and
procedures are based on treaties between the member states. Id. Directives require all EU member
states to enact legislation to implement policies by a given date. Id.
28. "The intentional torts of fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation are information torts because the
plaintiff has suffered loss in relying upon false or misleading statements made by defendants."
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reform would arm content providers that are victimized by frivolous or
bad faith takedown demands with the right to a federal court hearing, as
well as rights to legal or equitable remedies. This safeguard against
inappropriate takedown demands will punish and deter the use of
strategic takedown demands that have the potential to chill free speech
on the Internet.
Imposing this limited liability on ISPs is a crucial first step toward
permitting tort law to evolve to punish and deter online fraud, online
sexual harassment, invasion of privacy, and numerous other Internet
injuries. 29 Tort law has historically progressed through dramatic legal
cases or developments that abolished unjust barriers to obtaining
restitution.30 Breaching the citadel of ISP immunity will catalyze further
legal reforms that will protect consumers on the World Wide Web.
Instituting website liability for illegal postings has the potential to
jumpstart the field of cybertorts so that it can develop into an effective
social control mechanism for cyberspace.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF CYBERTORTS: A NEW AUDIT
Existing rules and principles can give us our present location,
our bearings, our latitude and longitude. The inn that shelters
for the night is not the journey's end. The law, like the traveler,
must be ready for the morrow. It must have a principle of
growth.
3l
This Part presents data from a statistical study of cyberlaw remedies
to show that new torts are evolving to protect the rights of ISPs,
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 23, at 94. Online defamation is the obvious example of an information
tort because by definition it includes widely disseminated derogatory statements about individuals or
entities. Many other traditional tort categories, such as assault, battery, or false imprisonment, are
not yet problematic because the Web does not allow the necessary physical presence.
29. The topic of ISPs' direct tort liability is beyond the scope of this Article. Online
intermediaries will have liability for their own direct torts, such as personal property torts, the
invasion of privacy, negligently enabling the spread of viruses, or failing to prevent cybercrimes.
The further expansion of ISP tort liability, the recognition of new duties of care, and the extension
of traditional tort theories to new cyberspace injuries are necessary developments for the long-term
welfare of consumers and other users.
30. Judge Cardozo's ground-breaking opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050
(N.Y. 1916), opened the door to development of products liability. The tort of invasion of privacy
had its genesis in a law review article by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis. See generally Samuel
Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
31. BENJAMIN N. CARDOzO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 19-20 (2d ed. 1973).
Vol. 80:335, 2005
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websites, search engines, and other Internet corporate entities, while
these same stakeholders are immunized from tort actions brought by
consumers and other computer users. 32 Cybertort litigation reverses the
pattern of traditional brick-and-mortar torts in which consumers
vindicate their rights against corporate wrongdoers. Repeat players such
as America Online, Inc. (AOL), Ford Motor Co., Mattel, Inc., and
Hollywood media providers dominate the cyberlegal landscape as
prevailing plaintiffs, but not as defendants.
Corporate stakeholders use their lobbying influence to expand their
online rights and to avoid liability. In the past decade, Congress -has
enacted several statutes that have increased the power of the "haves" in
cyberspace.33 The DMCA, for example, provides Hollywood with new
weapons to battle the downloading of copyrighted music and images.34
The owners of famous trademarks have gained protections against
dilution that are not available to small or medium businesses that have
less well-known trade names. 3 Similarly, Congress enacted the
32. The research methodology, including sample selection, for this database is explained in
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 23. The statistical database was updated from the earlier study, but the
methodology for collecting and examining the data is the same. As in the earlier study, coding
decisions were often difficult in determining what was a cybertort action. Many Intemet-related
cases, for example, included several causes of action. Spam-related cases invariably pleaded state
and federal computer crime statutes in addition to the tort of trespass to chattels. Many intellectual
property cases involved both the federal Lanham Act and a pendent tort cause of action. All cases
were classified according to the central thrust or gravamen of the action. The analysis in Chart Three
presents cases where the "predominant" cause of action was in tort or another substantive field.
33. See generally Jordana Boag, The Battle of Piracy Versus Privacy: How the Recording
Industry Association ofAmerica (RIAA) Is Using the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) as
Its Weapon Against Internet Users' Privacy Rights, 41 CAL. W. L. REv. 241 (2004) (arguing that
large copyright stakeholders are subordinating privacy rights of consumers by deploying new
statutory remedies protecting intellectual property).
34. The DMCA armed the entertainment industry with new remedies against circumvention
devices designed to decrypt the contents of DVDs. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1202(b) (2000). The
peer-to-peer file sharing movement on the Internet pits the movie, record, and film industries against
Internet users. In A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1005, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld a federal court order enjoining Napster
from facilitating the wholesale copying of music on its service. See also Universal City Studios, Inc.
v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 213. (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (enjoining websites from posting the
software which circumvents anti-copying software controls on DVDs).
35. The Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) provides new remedies for the dilution of
famous trademarks. The court determines whether a trademark is famous by balancing eight
statutory factors. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-98, sec. 3, § 43, 109 Stat.
985, 985-986 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000)). The eight FTDA factors
include the duration and extent of use of the mark, the nature of the advertising, and the acquired
distinctiveness of the mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). These factors favor the marks of the largest and
most powerful companies.
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Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999 (ACPA) to deter
the unauthorized registration or use of trademarks as Internet domain
names.
36
In contrast, consumers and small businesses have no practical tort
remedies against ISPs, websites, online information content providers,37
or other cyberspace intermediaries. Entire categories of victims of
Internet injuries, including defrauded consumers, victims of workplace
snooping, and those whose personal or financial privacy has been
invaded, lack any legal recourse against ISPs for online injuries. This
legal regime is inefficient because the service provider, not the
consumer, is generally in a superior position to determine whether an
online scam artist falsified a transmission path, used open proxies to
disguise the origin of e-mail messages, or used false contact information
to carry out a fraudulent scheme.38 If the ISP community owed a greater
duty to its subscribers, it would have incentives to develop technological
solutions to the problem of consumer fraud.39
Cyberspace law is flourishing when it comes to electronic evidence,4 °
36. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(l)(B) (stating that trademark holders should be protected from
misuse of domain names intending to "divert consumers from the mark owner's online location to a
site accessible under the domain name that could harm the goodwill represented by the mark, either
for commercial gain or with the intent to tamish or disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of
confusion").
37. The CDA defines an "information content provider" as "any person or entity that is
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the
Intemet or any other interactive computer service." 47 U.S.C. § 230(0(3) (2000).
38. Service providers are almost always in the best position to develop authentication
technologies to restrain spammers who use false identities for the sole purpose of sending spam to
millions of consumers. AOL's Vice Chairman estimated
that more than 80% of the current spam problem comes from other ISPs and hosting companies
that are infested with viruses. These software viruses, or "trojans" as we refer to them, typically
make their way onto machines via vulnerabilities in end-user software and the absence of
firewalls or anti-virus software. These viruses/trojans infect users' computers without their
knowledge and allow spamrnmers to use the infected machines to initiate or relay spam.
Growing Problem of Spam: Hearing on CAN-SPAM Act Before the Sen. Comm. on Commerce, Sci.
and Transp., 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Ted Leonsis, Vice Chairman, America Online, Inc.),
available at http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfn?id = 1199&wit id=3436 (last visited
Apr. 25, 2005).
39. In a Senate committee hearing, the Vice Chairman of AOL proposed further investigation of
several spain-fighting methods:
(1) for all ISPs to confirm that their members who are sending e-mail have accounts and are
allowed to send mail; and (2) for abuses indicated by ISP members to be handled as quickly as
they arise. We are continuing to work with our ISP colleagues to develop additional solutions
to the spain problem, both from a technology and enforcement perspective.
Id.
40. "Today it is black letter law that computerized data is discoverable if relevant." Anti-
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domestic cyberpiracy, 41 online gambling, 42 Internet advertising,
cybersquatting, 44 spamming,45 linking,46 online music piracy,47 Internet
Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 2120, 1995 WL 649934, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1995).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were revised to include a new rule requiring litigants to turn
over electronic data. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee's note (1993 Amendments).
Electronic smoking guns are the star witnesses in a growing number of cases. See, e.g., Knox v.
Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1330 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing e-mail messages from one employee to another
asking plaintiff whether she wished "horizontal good time"); Comiskey v. Automotive Indus.
Action Group, 40 F. Supp. 2d 877, 888 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (finding sexually charged e-mails served
as part of harassment claim); Harley v. McCoach, 928 F. Supp. 533, 540 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (noting
that e-mails documented racial discrimination).
41. In Panavision International v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996), a domain name
cyberpirate was found liable in a lawsuit in California because his attempt to sell a domain name
containing a corporation's famous trademark was deemed sufficient for jurisdiction. Id. at 622. The
defendant appealed this decision, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed personal jurisdiction in the
trademark case filed by owners of the marks PANAVISION and Panaflex. Panavision Int'l, L.P. v.
Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998). The defendant cybersquatter had registered the
domain names panavision.com and panaflex.com, and posted pictures of Pana, Illinois, on one
website and the word "hello" on the other. Id. at 1319. He then attempted to sell the domain names
to Panavision. Id. The court premised jurisdiction on the defendant's intention of doing business in
California and his tortious attempt to extort money from a California trademark owner. Id. at 1321-
22. The court upheld jurisdiction, employing the "effects test." Id. at 1321.
42. In Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio International Interlink, the plaintiff casino operator sued a
foreign Internet gambling business, claiming that the defendant infringed the plaintiff's trademark.
Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2002). The plaintiff served the
gambling business by regular mail to its attorney and its international courier, and by e-mail to its
Internet address. Id. at 1013. The gambling business contended that service was insufficient and that
personal jurisdiction was lacking. Id. at 1014. The court held that the alternative service was proper
because the defendant actively evaded the conventional means of service attempted by the plaintiff.
Id. at 1017. E-mail service was an appropriate alternative as the method of communication preferred
by the defendant. Id. The defendant's advertisements in the forum state and the injury to the plaintiff
in the forum state were sufficient to provide personal jurisdiction over the gambling business. Id. at
1021.
43. Private litigants may use state and federal deceptive trade practices acts to enjoin fraudulent
Internet advertising. For instance, a hotel chain sued Gator.com for its pop-up banner advertisements
under, inter alia, a state's deceptive trade practices act. E-Commerce Legislative Update, 19 E-
COMMERCE L. & STRATEGY 10 (2002) (citing Six Continents Hotels, Inc. v. Gator Corp., No. 1 02-
CV-3065 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 12, 2002)). The hotel also claimed that Gator's pop-up advertisements
infringed its registered trademarks and copyrights. Id.
44. "Cybersquatting is the act of registering a popular Internet address-usually a company
name-with the intent of selling it to its rightful owner." Webopedia, Cybersquatting, at
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/C/cybersquatting.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2005); see, e.g.,
Catalina Mktg. Int'l, Inc. v. CoolSavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 810 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (reversing
patent victory in favor of dot.com company); Amazon.com, Inc. v. Bamesandnoble.com, Inc., 239
F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (vacating preliminary injunction awarded in favor of Amazon.com
in patent dispute over one-stop Internet shopping business method); Cable News Network L.P.,
L.L.L.P. v. cnnews.com, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484, 494 (E.D. Va. 2001) (holding that plaintiff properly
perfected service under ACPA's in rem service procedure in domain name litigation); E. & J. Gallo
Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., 129 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1037 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (enjoining domain name
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taxation,48 and the problem of obtaining personal jurisdiction. 49 In less
than a decade, U.S. courts have forged new rules for e-commerce
patents50 and the law of e-commerce. 1 In our book, In Defense of Tort
registrant from violating famous winemaker's trademarks); Mattel, Inc. v. Adventure Apparel, No.
00 Civ. 4085 (RWS), 2001 U.S. Dist LEXIS 13885, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2001) (finding
cybersquatting in case where defendant registered domain names "barbiesbeachwear.com" and
"barbiesclothing.com" and "parked" them at Adventure Apparel website); Mattel, Inc. v. Internet
Dimensions, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 10066 (HB), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9747, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. July 13,
2000) (finding specific jurisdiction in domain name action involving cybersquatting claim in which
adult entertainment website was enjoined from using famous Barbie trademark owned by Mattel).
45. Spam e-mail is not merely a minor irritation, but a drain on American productivity.
"Rebutting a recent finding that spam is not a drain on worker productivity, [a] San Francisco-based
market research company ... has estimated that unwanted commercial e-mail cost U.S. corporations
$8.9 billion in 2002." Brian Morrissey, Span Costs Corporate America $9 Billion in 2002, at
http://www.clickz.com/stats/sectors/demographics/article.php/1565721 (last visited Mar. 24, 2005).
In Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1996), the court ruled
that an e-mail spammer did not have a First Amendment right to send massive amounts of
unsolicited, commercial e-mail to Internet subscribers. Id. at 445.
46. Ford Motor Co. v. 2600 Enters., 177 F. Supp. 2d 661, 662, 666 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (denying
injunctive relief to Ford Motor Co., which sought to enjoin defendants from maintaining domain
name, "FuckGeneralMotors.com," that takes user directly to Ford Motor Co.'s official website at
"ford.com"); Bernstein v. JC Penney, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1063, 1063-64 (C.D. Cal. 1998)
(dismissing claim that link to infringing materials constituted copyright infringement).
47. "It is estimated that 1 million illegal music files are posted on the Internet-yet few countries
outside the USA have adequate legislation to fight Internet piracy." Profile Publ'g & Mgmt. Corp.
APS v. Musicmaker.com, 242 F. Supp. 2d 363, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting one party's exhibit).
48. See Meghan Holohan, California May Pass Internet Sales Tax, COMPUTERWORLD, at
http://www.computerworld.com/industrytopics/retail/story/0,10801,49311,00.html (Aug. 31, 2000)
(reporting that California State Senate passed bill that, "if approved by the state Assembly and
signed by the governor, will require all California-based companies to add sales tax to online
purchases"). But see Jon Weisman, California Governor Vetoes Net Tax Bill, E-COMMERCE TIMES,
at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/4384.html (Sept 26, 2000) (noting that Governor Gray
Davis vetoed proposed law that would have required California businesses to charge sales tax for in-
state online transactions). See also Jeffrey M. Vesely & Richard E. Nielsen, Federal and California
Internet Tax Freedom Acts-What Do They Mean?, ST. & Loc. TAX BULL. (Pillsbury Winthrop
Shaw Pittman LLP, San Francisco, Cal.), July 2000, at 6 (explaining three-year moratorium placed
on Internet taxes by Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. 105-277, Div. C., title xi, 112 Stat. 2681,
2681-2719 (1998)), available at http://www.pmstax.com/ftp/state/bull0007.pdf (last visited Apr. 24,
2005).
49. Many U.S. courts have found that a plaintiff in an Internet-related case satisfies due process
by showing that: (1) the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting
activities in the forum state by invoking the benefits and protections of the forum state's laws; (2)
the plaintiff's claim arises out of the defendant's forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of
jurisdiction over the out-of-state defendant is reasonable. MICHAEL L. RUSTAD & CYRUS DAFTARY,
E-BUSINESS LEGAL HANDBOOK § 7.03 (2003).
50. No single development has spurred the growth of Internet-related patents more than State
Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(validating business method patent based on mathematical algorithms).
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Law, we made the rosy prediction that new torts were on the horizon to
protect consumers in cyberspace5 2 We were mistaken. Tort law has yet
to expand to defend the consuming public against a wide variety of
wrongdoing on the World Wide Web because of the overly broad
immunity conferred on ISPs.
A. Repeat Players Dominate the Internet Legal Landscape
Repeat players shape the Internet litigation environment because they
have extensive financial and legal resources as well as invaluable prior
experience in vindicating their intellectual property, contract, and tort
rights. Marc Galanter's classic essay, "Why the 'Haves' Come Out
Ahead," explained the great advantages that powerful corporate entities
have in maneuvering through the obstacle course of administrative
agencies as well as in the courtroom. 53 "Repeat players" generally
prevail over "one-shotters" in cases that settle or go to trial because of
their greater wealth and access to the specialized knowledge that is
provided by national law firms.54 Consumers are the classic example of
"one-shotters" who lack the resources to vindicate their rights in
cyberspace. They typically cannot afford to retain a lawyer, let alone the
top legal talent needed to untangle complex issues such as serving
process to defendants in other countries, establishing personal
jurisdiction in cyberspace, or locating the assets of cyber-wrongdoers
that have been hidden in secret cross-border locations.55
51. The growth of the Internet involves updating and adapting common law principles to
cyberspace:
[Richard] Nixon's observation that courts were developing new rights and remedies to adjust to
an emerging technology applies equally well to the contemporary age of the Internet. Just as in
Nixon's day, the rise of a new technology requires courts to stretch traditional tort doctrines as
well as to create updated torts to keep pace with new civil wrongs.
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 23, at 77. See generally Robert A. Wittie & Jane K. Winn, Electronic
Records and Signatures Under the Federal E-SIGN Legislation and the UETA, 56 Bus. LAW. 293
(2000) (discussing state electronic commerce legislation in a number of jurisdictions and comparing
state to federal developments).
52. THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 235-36 (2001).
53. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974).
54. Id. at 98-101 (arguing that certain well-heeled corporate entities, "repeat players," have huge
advantages over "one-shotters" in seeking legal remedies because of mismatch in resources);
Samuel Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don 't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement,
44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 52-53 (1996) (citing examples of how "repeat players" enjoy strategic
advantages over "one-shotters" in settlement).
55. According to one commentator:
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Without the prospect of locating a solvent primary wrongdoer who
can be served with legal process, the only available defendant is the ISP,
which is immunized from tort liability. Consumers and other computer
users are generally left without any meaningful redress for their injuries,
even if the facts and legal arguments are overwhelmingly in their favor.
When there is little or no probability of detection or prosecution,
predatory torts such as online fraud will skyrocket. "Cybertorts are now
a fact of life for computer users. A recent report by Riptech, Inc. projects
a sixty-four percent annual increase in Internet attacks against private
and public organizations worldwide." 56 The cyberlaw litigation
landscape reflects the hegemonic position of repeat players over one-
shot consumers. When a consumer experiences financial loss, identity
theft, or the malicious meltdown of their personal computer, the online
cybercriminal almost always defaults or is not locatable. The primary
wrongdoer is generally beyond the reach of jurisdiction, particularly
because the ISP has no duty to aid in locating the origin of the illegal
posting. Many consumer frauds, for example, originate in the new
Russian Republics, which have become "a popular venue for innovative
cyberscams involving credit card numbers stolen from websites. '' 57
While repeat players enjoy a favorable legal environment, consumers
have no recourse against web hosts, websites, or service providers that
benefit from selling advertising or providing other services for
The Internet offers low-cost communication, the capacity to reach a global audience, and a
presumptive veneer of credibility stemming from the anonymity of cyberspace. Thus, Internet
users may find it hard to distinguish genuine sources of information from fraudulent sources,
creating a fertile environment for all kinds of Internet fraud.
Miriam R. Albert, E-Buyer Beware: Why Online Auction Fraud Should Be Regulated, 39 AM. BUS.
L.J. 575, 578-79 (2002); see George P. Long, III, Comment, Who Are You?: Identity and Anonymity
in Cyberspace, 55 U. PIr. L. REv. 1177, 1178-79 (1994). Even when consumers are able to unveil
anonymous respondents, they face substantial procedural barriers in seeking redress against online
defendants. Crowley v. Cybersource Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1269-70 (N.D. Cal. 2001)
(dismissing Wiretap Act claims against Amazon.com because online company simply received
communication and did not "intercept" communication as required by Wiretap Act; also dismissing
Electronic Communications Privacy Act claims because Amazon.com was online retailer rather than
provider of electronic communication services or remote computing services as required under
federal statute); Lieschke v. RealNetworks, Inc., Nos. 99 C 9274, 99 C 7380, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1683, at *2 (N.D. I11. Feb. 10, 2000) (enforcing RealNetworks' arbitration clause dismissing
consumer's federal court decision).
56. Gordon A. Coffee & Charles B. Klein, Combating Cyber-Torts: Protections and Pitfalls of
the Virginia Computer Crimes Act, 2 CYBERCRiME L. REP. 3, 3 (2002), available at
http://www.winston.com/pdfs/CCLRlI 10402.pdf.
57. Michael L. Rustad, Private Enforcement of Cybercrime on the Electronic Frontier, I1 S. CAL.
INTERDIsc. L.J. 63, 74 (2001).
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cybercriminals. Consumers are left defenseless in cyberspace because
immunized service providers are the only identifiable deep pocket. ISPs
currently have no duty to police the Internet or to develop technologies
to track down off-shore posters of objectionable materials.
Charts One, Two, and Three confirm that cybertort laws, particularly
those that protect individuals from corporate misdeeds, illegal postings,
and cybercriminals, have yet to develop. Our statistical analysis of the
Internet legal landscape includes all U.S. dispositions where plaintiffs
prevailed by receiving either an equitable or monetary damages award
between January 1992 and July 2004.58 We find that the cybertort
landscape is a reverse image of the tort cases found in traditional civil
litigation. Corporations frequently file cyberlaw cases in order to "push
the envelope" on federal intellectual property statutes protecting their
intangible assets.
-Internet litigation is the only substantive branch of tort law where
federal court filings are more common than state court litigation. During
the seminal era of cyberspace litigation between 1992 and 2004, federal
courts decided seventy-five percent of the cases. 59 This reflects the high
proportion of intellectual property cases as compared to common law
disputes, which are generally litigated in state court. 60 Repeat players
such as ISPs have no qualms about protecting their rights through
Internet lawsuits over intellectual property, tort, and contract rights, all
of which are primarily resolved in federal courts. Consumers, in contrast,
lack useful remedies against the unidentified perpetrators of Internet
crimes and therefore do not file the common law tort claims that
classically appear on state court dockets. The best tort reform would be
to impose a limited duty on providers, which would motivate ISPs and
other Internet "repeat players" to develop better methods of protecting
consumers from third party crimes or torts.
58. These new empirical findings are consistent with findings from an earlier study of
cyberlitigation for the period 1992-2002. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 23, at 86 (reporting 114
Internet-related cases in which there was at least one tort cause of action).
59. See Chart One, infra p. 352. Sixty-four percent of the business torts were decided in federal
courts because the great majority of these cyberspace disputes were actions to protect trade secrets
or other intellectual property rights on the Internet. Twenty-three of the thirty-six online defamation
cases (64%) were decided in state courts. Of the nine online plaintiff's victories in privacy cases, six
were litigated in state courts.
60. STEVEN K. SMITH ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ-153177, CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF
STATE COURTS, 1992: TORT CASES 1N LARGE COUNTIES 2 (April 1995) (documenting state court
dockets in largest U.S. cities for 1992), available at http://www.lectlaw.com/files/litl5.htm (last
visited Apr. 24, 2005).
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B. Cyberlaw Generally Protects Corporate Repeat Players
Chart One











(Jan. 1992-July 2004) N=562
Chart One classifies prevailing plaintiffs by their principal cause of
action in all successful Internet cases decided between January 1, 1992,
and July 1, 2004. 61 As Chart One illustrates, intellectual property
infringement claims account for fifty-eight percent of the decided
cases. 62 Intellectual property litigation is the source of nearly all large
61. The research methodology, including sample selection, for this database is explained in
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 23. The statistical database was updated from the earlier study, but the
methodology for collecting and examining the data is the same. As in the earlier study, coding
decisions were often difficult in determining what constitutes a cybertort action. Many Internet-
related cases, for example, included several causes of action. Spain-related cases invariably pleaded
state and federal computer crime statutes in addition to the tort of trespass to chattels. Many
intellectual property cases involved both the federal Lanham Act and a pendent tort cause of action.
All cases were classified according to the central thrust or gravamen of the action. The analysis in
Chart Three presents cases where the "predominant" cause of action was in tort or another
substantive field. See Chart Three, infra p. 357.
62. We classify domain name disputes as intellectual property conflicts because the owners of
trademarks file these lawsuits against domain name registrants. The FTDA applies when a website
blurs a famous trademark by incorporating the mark in a domain name. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).
Similarly, a domain name can tarnish a trademark, as in Mattel, Inc. v. Jcom, Inc., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1467, (S.D.N.Y. 1996), where the Barbie trademark was used on an adult entertainment web
site. Id. at 1470. The court held that the use of the Barbie trademark combined with particular fonts
and color schemes tarnished the mark. See id.; see also Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entm't Group, Ltd.,
No. C96-13OWD, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11626, at *2-3 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 9, 1996) (finding adult
entertainment website tarnished distinctive mark of famous board game). In addition, trademark
infringement may occur on the Internet when users of trademarks go to a domain name expecting to
find sales or services provided by the trademark owner. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 365-66 (4th Cir. 2001).
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awards in cyberspace. For example, Sun Microsystems, Inc. recently
agreed to pay Eastman Kodak $92 million to settle a patent infringement
lawsuit over claims about Java technologies.
63
Cyberlaw largely comprises disputes over maintaining and expanding
the rights of service providers and other powerful stakeholders, rather
than redressing the injuries, losses, or other damages suffered by
consumers. Only eighteen percent of the Internet plaintiff victories were
classified as mostly cybertort cases (N=99).64 Many of the cybertorts
arose out of intellectual property disputes. The business torts of unfair
competition and misappropriation are often deployed in trade secret, as
well as trademark, litigation.65
Thirteen percent of the cyberlaw cases were based on contract
disputes in diverse actions such as wrongful termination cases, the
failure to pay licensing fees, or the breach of fiduciary duty among
investors in Internet start-ups (N=76).6 6 Twelve percent of cases were
based on constitutional or statutory grounds as opposed to common law.
Most of these cases were filed against public school districts that
disciplined students for improper postings on private websites. The
students obtained relief on First Amendment grounds because the
materials were protected speech. 67 The remaining few cases were
Internet-related statutory causes of action, such as challenges to sexual
offender registry law, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA), and state use taxes.68 The overwhelming conclusion is that
63 . Jay Wrolstad, Kodak, Sun Settle Java Patent Dispute, NewsFactor Networks, at
http://www.newsfactor.com/story.xhtml?story-.title=Kodak-Sun-Settle-Java-Patent-
Dispute&story-id=27459 (Oct. 8, 2004).
64. See Chart One, supra p. 352.
65. See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenUcom, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 471, 509, 510 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (granting injunction in copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and unfair
competition action over use of domain name).
66. See Chart One, supra p. 352; see, e.g., Tansey v. Trade Show News Network, Inc., C.A. No.
18796, 2002 WL 31521092, at *1-2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2002) (granting relief where outside
investors were short-changed).
67. See, e.g., Killion v. Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448-49 (W.D. Pa. 2001)
(granting summary judgment in favor of student where school disciplined student for anti-
administration e-mail); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089-90 (W.D.
Wash. 2000) (granting temporary injunction against disciplinary action taken when student allowed
visitors to website to vote on who would "die" next, that is, who would be subject of next mock
obituary); Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177 (E.D. Mo. 1998)
(enjoining school board from expelling student for inflammatory website).
68. Doe v. Dep't of Pub. Safety ex. rel Lee, 271 F.3d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 2001) (entering declaratory
and permanent injunctive relief prohibiting state from disseminating information pursuant to
Megan's Law); Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 404 (4th Cir. 2000) (enjoining enforcement of
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repeat players, in dramatic contrast to other classes of plaintiffs, have
enjoyed great success in protecting their rights.
Chart Two









(Jan. 1992-July 2004) N=143
Chart Two substantiates the claim that intellectual property owners have
benefited from a favorable legal environment in cyberspace. National,
international, and medium-sized corporations were frequently plaintiffs,
but they were far less likely to be defendants in cybertort cases. As
shown in Chart Two, fifty-eight percent of the prevailing plaintiffs were
corporations or other organizations that are likely to be repeat players.69
Virginia statute prohibiting state employees from accessing sexually explicit materials on computers
owned or leased by state); McVeigh v. Cohen, 983 F. Supp. 215, 216-17 (D.D.C. 1998) (ruling that
U.S. Navy violated plaintiff's rights under ECPA, APA, Navy policy, and Fourth and Fifth
Amendments by intercepting e-mail in which plaintiff referred to his homosexuality).
69. AOL, for example, was the plaintiff in scores of anti-spam cases. See, e.g., America Online,
Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Disc., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 890, 892 (N.D. Iowa 2001) (granting relief
against unsolicited bulk e-mailers); America Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Disc., Inc., 121 F.
Supp. 2d 1255, 1268 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (denying AOL's summary judgment motion); America
Online, Inc. v. CN Prods., Inc., No. CIV.A.98-552-A, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1607, at *1 (E.D. Va.
Feb. 10, 1999) (affirming discovery order in favor of AOL). Ford Motor Co. was another typical
repeat player protecting its intangible assets in cyberspace. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Catalanotte,
342 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming that defendant "trafficked in" domain name
Rebooting Cybertort Law
National or international corporations were successful plaintiffs in
twenty-two percent of the 143 cybertort cases (N=3 1).7 Medium-sized
corporations and small corporations/websites comprised twenty percent
(N=29) and thirteen percent (N=18) of the successful plaintiffs,
respectively. This deployment of the legal system by formidable
stakeholders "is not a new phenomenon, but has occurred throughout the
twentieth century at times when technology outpaced the development of
the law."9
71
Individuals are the leading type of successful plaintiffs, but their
disputes tend to be with other individuals, not with corporate America or
other commercial interests.72 When individuals file cybertort lawsuits,
FordWorld.com within meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000) by offering to sell domain name to
Ford Motor Co.); Ford Motor Co. v. Greatdomains.com, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 635, 640-41 (E.D.
Mich. 2001) (finding sufficient facts for cybersquatting claim in favor of Ford); Ford Motor Co. v.
Lapertosa, 126 F. Supp. 2d 463, 464 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (finding danger of irreparable harm to
plaintiff because Ford would have the ongoing burden of monitoring misappropriations of its trade
secrets); Ford Motor Co. v. Ford Financial Solutions, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1129 (N.D. Iowa
2000) (finding trademark infringement for "colorable imitation" of Ford trademark in "financial
services industry" and ordering defendant to assign domain name to international corporation); Ford
Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745, 746, 754 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (dissolving temporary
restraining order against website posting Ford's trade secrets). Mattel was also a repeat player,
primarily suing to protect its trademarks and trade name. See generally Mattel, Inc. v. Antelman,
No. 01 Civ. 8912 (LBS), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1261 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 29, 2002); Mattel v.
Adventurer Apparels, No. 00 Civ. 4085 (RWS), 2001 U.S. Dist LEXIS 13885 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7,
2001); Mattel v. Internet Dimensions, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1620 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2000); Mattel,
Inc. v. Jcom, Inc., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1467 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
70. See, e.g., Cable News Network L.P. v. cnnews.com, 56 Fed. Appx. 599, 601 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(ordering in rem relief in domain name dispute against Chinese news company defendant); Eli Lilly
& Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 2000) (entering preliminary injunction
against dietary supplement manufacturer's "HERBROZAC" mark because it caused dilution which
was element of FTDA); Caterpillar Inc. v. Telescan Techs., L.L.C., No. CIV.A.00- 1111, 2002 U.S.
Dist LEXIS 3477, at *8 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2002) (holding that infringer's verbatim incorporation of
Caterpillar's marks in disputed domain names confused consumers); Caesar's World v.
Caesarspalace.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 502, 503 (E.D. Va. 2000) (finding in rem jurisdiction in favor
of famous casino in cybersquatting case); AT&T Corp. v. Syntet, Inc., No. 96 CO 110, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1954, at *10, *39 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 1997) (granting injunctive relief to AT&T in
Internet-related trademark infringement case). The largest corporations also tend to be repeat
players. One of the most frequent Internet litigants was Playboy Enterprises, which sued domain
name registrants, cybersquatters, and other infringers. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839
F. Supp. 1552, 1554, 1559, 1561 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
71. Bruce P. Keller, Condemned to Repeat the Past: The Reemergence of Misappropriation and
Other Common Law Theories of Protection for Intellectual Property, 11 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 401,
406 (1997).
72. See, e.g., Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 936 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (enjoining
defendants from selling, distributing for sale, promoting for sale, or placing on "members only"
websites any and all images of plaintiff); Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 536-37 (Minn. 2002)
(refusing to enforce Alabama tort judgment against Minnesota resident for defamation and invasion
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the causes of action are typically online defamation, employment-related
torts, or, to a lesser extent, the invasion of privacy. Punitive damages
awards to cybertort plaintiffs usually arise out of incendiary
interpersonal disputes carried out on the Internet. In more than a decade
of cyberlaw litigation, only one consumer won a legal or equitable
remedy against a company in an Internet-related commercial
transaction.73 Large corporations are less likely to be sued because they
enjoy § 230 immunity. ISPs are in the enviable position of being repeat
players who use litigation to extend their rights and remedies, while
being immunized from lawsuits by consumers and other computer users.
Individuals and small companies were the most likely to suffer defeat
in these lawsuits. Nearly half of the unsuccessful defendants (48%,
N=68) were startup e-commerce companies, spam e-mailers,
cybersquatters, websites, or other small companies. One in four cases
involved individual defendants (N=35). Medium-sized companies were
defendants in only 13 percent of the cases (N=18), followed by
nationally or internationally known corporations (11%, N=6). The
remaining six defendants were other entities (4%).
C. Most Cybertorts Involve Disputes over Intellectual Property
Intellectual property disputes predominate in cyberspace because
service providers and other content providers are also content creators
interested in protecting and extending their rights. As America evolves
from a durable goods economy to an information-based one, torts are
shifting from accident law to protecting corporate stakeholders from
infringement of their intellectual property rights. The Internet is being
enclosed by "legally backed digital fences, lengthened copyright terms
and increased penalties.,, 74 Repeat players utilize common law-based
remedies, as well as federal statutes to protect their intellectual
of privacy for statements made by Minnesota resident on Internet).
73. The case, Freeman ex rel Mortgage.com v. Levine, No 00-322262-CA-03 (Fla. Miami-Dade
County Ct. filed Aug. 10, 2001), involved suit against eleven of Mortgage.com's top management
officials for online financial fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. See Matthew Hagman, Verdicts and
Settlements 06.23.03, DAILY Bus. REv., at 1, available at http://delao-
marko.com/_private/newspages/MDCM%2OBusiness%2oReview%2006.23.03.pdf (last visited Apr.
24, 2005). On June 13, 2003, the parties settled for $4.7 million. Id.
74. James Boyle, Foreword: The Opposite of Property?, 66 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1 (2003)
(quoting Jerry Reichman and David Lange).
75. At common law, the infringement of intellectual property rights had its genesis in the law of









1%g invasion of Privacy
P. Liab./Wnty 6%





(Jan. 1992-July 2004) N= 143
Individuals who prevail as plaintiffs in cyberspace litigation generally
allege reputational, privacy, or financial injuries against other individuals
or entities, in sharp contrast to the largely personal injury docket of
traditional tort law. No plaintiff has won a case based on claims that he
or she suffered personal injury in cyberspace from the negligent acts of
repeat players. To date, for example, no online patient has recovereddamages based on an injury arising from the practice of telemedicine. 7
No computer professional has been held liable for professional
negligence insn Internet case, even though there is an epidemic of
security breaches due to bad software. 8 No actions for defective
software, Internet security services, or computer products have been
successful.
Almost all Internet cases involve plaintiffs seeking redress for
76. Novell, for example, aggressively employs its patent portfolio, and thus federal patent law, as
a principal means to defend its open-source software and proprietary offerings against e-patent
attacks. Jay Wrolstad, Novell Pledges to Protect Open Source Against Legal Claims, at
http://www.newsfactor.com/story.xhtml?story-id=27606 (Oct. 14, 2004); see 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103(2000) (establishing conditions for patentability of inventions).
77. "The Institute of Medicine has defined telemedicine to encompass telephone, video and
electronic transmission of medical information using telephone or digital technology." Alissa R.
Spielberg, Online Without a Net: Physician-Patient Communication by Electronic Mail, 25 Am. J.L.
& MED. 267, 287-88 (1999).
78. See Thomas G. Wolpert, Product Liability and Software Implicated in Personal Injury, 60
DEF. COUNSEL J. 519, 521 (1993).
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financial loss or injury to reputation. Personal injury or property damage
cyberspace claims have yet to evolve, and therefore there have been no
damage awards for physical pain, mental suffering, disability,
disfigurement, or loss of enjoyment of life. In sharp contrast, a U.S.
Department of Justice study of tort cases in large U.S. counties revealed
that ninety-two percent of traditional state tort cases involved personal
injury caused by negligent or intentional acts.7 9
Few personal injury actions are filed in Internet-related cases because
of the lack of successful precedent. U.S. courts have been slow to
recognize any negligence-based actions in cyberspace. Perhaps the most
significant reason for the paucity of personal injury-based cybertorts is
that the plaintiff does not typically suffer a clear-cut physical injury from
surfing the Web. When an individual is victimized in cyberspace, it is
generally an information-based injury, such as loss of reputation,
invasion of privacy, or fraud.
In the brick-and-mortar world, negligence-based cases dominate the
legal landscape.80 The most frequent type of traditional tort case involves
an individual suing another individual (47%), followed by an individual
suing a business (37%). 81 The universe of Internet torts, in sharp
contrast, continues to be doctrinally rooted in personal property torts that
originated during England's feudal period, such as conversion and
trespass to chattels. An astonishing 101 of the 143 cybertort plaintiffs
82(71%) based their claims on intentional torts. In our sample, plaintiffs
in only four cases asserted negligence or malpractice causes of action.
Corporations, rather than individual litigants, filed three-quarters of the
cybertort cases in which negligence was at issue.
Business tort or fraud cases arising out of e-commerce dominated the
cyberspace docket. Intentional business torts, such as fraud or
misrepresentation, intentional interference with contract, unfair
competition, or the misappropriation of trade secrets, composed the
single largest category of intentional torts (35%, N=50). 83 Thirty-six out
79. SMITH ET AL., supra note 60, at 1-2.
80. The U.S. Department of Justice study of tort cases in large U.S. counties concluded that the
majority of cases disposed were automobile torts. Id. at 1. Only one in ten cases involved more
complex litigation such as medical malpractice, products liability, or toxic torts litigation. Id.
81. Id. at 5.
82. The intentional torts that we included were trespass to chattels/conversion, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, business torts/fraud, and miscellaneous intentional torts. See Chart
Three, supra p. 357.
83. See Chart Three, supra p. 357.
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of the fifty business tort cases or fraud cases were filed by corporate
entities. Medium to large corporations filed almost half of the business
tort cases (twenty-three out of fifty).
In more than a decade of Internet cases, only one company has been
forced by a court to make any restitution for the sale of defective goods
on its website. 84 This sole successful products liability action, a 2003
case, arose out of the website sale of a field-monitoring device for
tracking criminals under house arrest. 85 The manufacturer's website
advertised that its field-monitoring unit in the offender's home would
detect any tampering. 86 However, when a murderer cut off the ankle
device, he was out of range of the monitoring unit, so the home unit did
not detect the tampering.87 The court refused to impose a legal duty on
the manufacturer to make a tamper-proof field-monitoring device. 88
Similarly, the court found that the monitoring device did not breach any
express or implied warranty, nor was it defectively manufactured. 89 The
victim's estate successfully brought an action only for misrepresentation
based on false statements about the field-monitoring unit on the
company's website.90
Repeat player corporations tower above other plaintiff categories in
litigation over personal property torts in cyberspace. Nearly a quarter of
the cases in the sample were trespass to chattels or conversion actions
filed by ISPs or other repeat players against spain e-mailers or fraudulent
cyberpirates. 91 A typical example is America Online, Inc. v. National
84. Kirby v. B.I. Inc., No. CIV.A.4:98-CV-1 136-Y, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16964, at *49-50
(N.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2003).
85. Id. at *2-16.
86. Id. at*19.
87. Id. at *20.
88. Id. at *37 (ruling that manufacturer did not have design defect in its security bracelet because
it was not feasible to produce tamper-proof product).
89. Id. at *42 (ruling that there was no express warranty because no representations were made to
plaintiff); id. at *44 (ruling that field monitor device or security bracelet was merchantable in that it
was fit for ordinary purposes for which devices were used).
90. Id. at * 19-20 (ruling that public representations made by company on its website were false
and misleading).
91. For the period of 1992-2002, there were 114 cybertort cases. In the earlier research, twenty-
seven percent [N=31] of the cybertort cases involved defamation or injurious falsehood claims. The
four most common Internet-related actions were business torts (35%, [N40]), personal property
torts, including trespass to chattels or conversion (28%, [N=32]), and online defamation (27%,
[N=3 ]). Ninety-seven percent of the 114 cybertorts were intentional tort cases, in contrast to the
negligence cases dominating traditional caseloads. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 23, at 93.
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Health Care Discount, Inc., 92 in which the ISP deployed the ancient tort
of trespass to chattels against a spam e-mailer. 93 The court gauged
compensatory damages by charging the spammer $2.50 per thousand
unwanted e-mails, for a total of $337,500. 94 Perhaps the most high
profile cyber-conversion case arose out of the fraudulent conversion of
the Sex.com domain name. 95 In that case, the trial court levied a $65
million judgment against a pornographer. 96 However, the plaintiff is
unlikely to collect this award because the defendant fled to an off-shore
venue to escape the judgment.97
Online defamation cases accounted for one in four cybertort cases,
and it is in this substantive field of tort law that individuals
predominate.98 The defendants in these cases were almost all individuals,
rather than online businesses or providers. Twenty-eight of the thirty-six
winning online defamation cases involved individuals suing other
individuals. The few non-individual claims arose out of false or
defamatory statements about business practices that were published on
websites. 99 A telecommunications company, for example, filed a
92. 174 F. Supp. 2d 890 (N.D. Iowa 2001).
93. Id. at 893.
94. "ld. at 901.
95. Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming judgment of federal
district court as to claims for breach of contract, and breach of third-party contract, but reversing
ruling that domain names, although a form of property, were intangibles not subject to conversion).
96. Id. at 1027; Laurie Flynn, Cybersquatting Draws Heavy Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2001, at
C6.
97. "Although Kremen got vindication of the legal win, he has not been able to collect money
from Cohen, who is wanted on a warrant for not appearing in court." Michael Bartlett, Right to a
Domain Name at Issue in Sex.cor Case, at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-mONEW/is_2002_Feb20/ai-83087547 (Feb. 20, 2002).
While the primary defendant defaulted, Verisign recently settled the case with Sex.com. Dawn
Kawamoto, Sex.com, VeriSign Settle Domain Name Suit, available at http://news.com.com/2100-
1038_3-5195669.html (April 20, 2004).
98. Courts vary in defining defamation, and often a particular definition or rule is peculiar to a
small number of jurisdictions. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 111, at 773 (5th ed. 1984). Defamation is "that which tends to injure 'reputation' in the
popular sense; to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which the plaintiff is held,
or to excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him." Id. Keeton
describes the prima facie case as follows:
it has always been necessary for the plaintiff to prove as a part of his prima facie case that the
defendant (1) published a statement that was (2) defamatory (3) of and concerning the plaintiff.
In a typical case of defamation, the publisher (1) realized that the statement made was
defamatory, (2) intended to refer to the plaintiff, and (3) intended to communicate it to a third
person or persons.
Id. § 113, at 802.
99. A business defamation lawsuit occurs when an untrue statement is communicated which
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business defamation action against defendants who posted negative
messages about its corporate practices.100
Because corporations have no right to privacy, it is not unexpected
that all of the privacy-based cybertort cases involved individuals suing
their neighbors, employers, or strangers (N=9). Similarly, the only
intentional infliction of emotional distress case was filed on behalf of an
individual against another individual. The rarity of emotional distress
cases is notable considering that the Internet can readily be used as a tool
of sexual harassment and other forms of gender discrimination.1°1
Intentional torts, for the most part information-based and personal
property litigation, have evolved, but, as Chart Three reveals, there are
almost no successful actions for negligence or strict liability. Traditional
tort law evolved in response to industrial or automobile accidents that
caused death or permanent disability.0 2 The law of cybertorts has been
too slow to extend the concepts of products liability'0 3 to cyberspace. 10 4
No personal injury or wrongful death claims have resulted in plaintiffs
victories, even in the most recent period of cyberspace litigation.
"prejudice[s] [the business entity] in the conduct of its business and deter[s] others from dealing
with it." A.F.M. Corp. v. Corp. Aircraft Mgmt., 626 F. Supp. 1533, 1551 (D. Mass. 1985); see, e.g.,
Amway Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., :98-CV-726, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 372, at *15-16
(W.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2000) (ruling that Amway made prima facie showing that P & G's web site was
aimed at forum and caused harm to its business reputation).
100. Global Telemedia Int'l, Inc. v. Doe 1, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1263 (C.D. Cal. 2001)
(granting defendant's motion to dismiss on grounds that California's Anti-SLAPP (Strategic
Litigation Against Public Participation) provisions applied and defendant's postings about company
were protected as exercise of free speech in connection with public issue); see also
Media3Technologies, LLC v. Mail Abuse Prevention Sys., LLC, 00-CV-12524-MEL, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1310, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 2, 2001) (dismissing business defamation or trade libel
claim against web host that argued its business reputation had been injured by being placed on ISP's
"black-hole list").
101. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 23, at 128-29.
102. KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 52, at 29-37 (discussing period from 1825 to 1894 as
negligence era in American tort law).
103. The field of products liability refers to rights and remedies to redress personal injuries and
economic losses caused by defective products. "Products liability is the name currently given to the
area of the law involving the liability of those who supply goods or products for the use of others to
purchasers, users, and bystanders for losses of various kinds resulting from so-called defects in those
products." KEETON ET AL., supra note 98, § 95A, at 677. It is unclear whether the concept of
products liability can be extended to defective information on websites. Nathan D. Leadstrom,
Internet Web Sites as Products Under Strict Products Liability: A Call for an Expanded Definition
of Product, 40 WASHBuRN L.J. 532, 534 (2001).
104. In the earlier study that this Article updates, there were "no products liability or warranty
actions and only a trivial number of negligence-based cases." Rustad & Koenig, supra note 23, at
113.
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Personal injury or death claims are rarely based on website activity.
Most tort injuries are financial injuries; reputation damage; or the
unauthorized theft of trade secrets, privacy, or other information-based
losses. The injury problem in cyberspace is based on intangible losses,
unlike the disfigurement or pain and suffering experienced by the
victims of physical injury. Nevertheless, these economic or information-
based injuries are legally protectable interests.
In summary, the current cybertort landscape protects dominant repeat
players while leaving consumers with little or no protection for financial
injuries, the loss of privacy and identity, and other information-based
intrusions or losses. Unlike traditional brick-and-mortar torts that focus
on personal injuries, cybertorts have yet to evolve to provide remedies
for information-based torts outside of the narrow band of intentional
torts used by the business community. This lopsided progression of
cybertort law has left consumers with an injury problem in cyberspace.
II. THE PATH OF CYBERTORT LAW
The Internet's pace of adoption eclipses all other technologies
that preceded it. Radio was in existence 38 years before 50
million people tuned in; TV took thirteen years to reach that
benchmark. Sixteen years after the first PC kit came out, 50
million people were using one. Once it was opened to the
general public, the Internet crossed that line in four years. 0 5
This Part traces the pathways of cyberspace legal precedents that
explain our empirical finding that most cybertorts are stillborn. Courts
have stretched § 230 excessively, protecting ISPs against distributor
liability and almost every other tort cause of action.10 6 This bloating of
ISP immunity to encompass most torts has resulted in a legal
environment that is contrary to the interests of consumers and other
Internet users.
The expansive immunity given to ISPs by § 230 has "transform[ed]
105. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE EMERGING DIGITAL ECONOMY 4 (1998).
106. Courts have expanded the meaning of 47 U.S.C. § 230(f(2) (2000) to include a wide range
of Internet services, not just ISPs. For example, a court found eBay's online auction service was
entitled to protection under § 230. Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 714 n.7 (2002)
(defining eBay as "interactive computer service provider" within meaning of § 230). Similarly, a
Washington State court classified Amazon.com's online bookstore as an interactive computer




the Internet into an almost liability-free zone for libelous content.",1°7
The most dominant online intermediaries enjoy unlimited immunity
while the principal tortfeasor is generally judgment-proof or inaccessible
by legal process. This unhinged legal environment creates "considerable
harm not only to those whose reputations and livelihood are endangered
by libelous statements, but also to the potential of the Internet as a
reliable, easily accessible, and inexpensive means of communication."'
10 8
A. Pre-CDA Cybertort Developments
The law embodies the story of a nation's development through
many centuries .... In order to know what it is, we must know
what it has been, and what it tends to become.' 
09
Oliver Wendell Holmes drew upon more than six centuries of
common law development in his renowned 1897 lecture, "The Path of
the Law." "10 He wrote during a period of revolutionary tort law
development, which had been impelled by advances in transportation
and communication technologies. Prior to the late nineteenth century, the
law of torts was fundamentally about defending community
tranquility."' In the nineteenth century, the law of negligence progressed
to provide remedies for mass accidents caused by broken-down rail
trestles, slipshod maintenance of tracks, or reckless operation of trains." 1
2
When Justice Holmes gave his legendary address, privacy-based torts,
along with remedies for misuse of novel technologies such as
107. Christopher Butler, Plotting the Return of an Ancient Tort to Cyberspace: Towards a New
Federal Standard of Responsibility for Defamation for Internet Service Providers, 6 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 247, 248 (2000).
108. Id.
109. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW I (Little, Brown & Co. 1945) (1881).
110. See generally OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS 167 (1920).
111. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common
Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 974-78 (1989) (arguing that law of torts reflects community
norms).
112. In an earlier article, one of the Authors elaborated:
Before there were mega cases, there was mega death from mass disasters, such as railroad or
industrial accidents. The law of torts entered the negligence era "around the turn of the
nineteenth century as turnpikes and burgeoning industry were vastly accelerating the pulse of
activity and confronting society with an accident problem of hitherto unprecedented
dimensions."
Michael L. Rustad, Smoke Signals from Private Attorneys General in Mega Social Policy Cases, 51
DEPAUL L. REV. 511, 534 (2001) (footnote omitted).
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"instantaneous photographs," were being born." 3
In the new millennium, American society is once again undergoing a
technological conversion of great consequence. This time, America is
evolving from a durable commodities-based economy to one based on
the licensing of software, intellectual property, and other intangibles. To
trace the path of Internet law, we need only review a decade and a half of
legal precedents.
An Internet fraudster once claimed that his company "will either
develop a machine itself or be so well known that a traveler from the
future will go back in time and provide the company with the technology
to develop the time machine."' '4 If time could be suddenly turned back
to 1990 and you were to look about you, what would seem extraordinary
about the ascendancy of the Internet? To begin with, the World Wide
Web had yet to be invented,15 and most international corporations did
not have websites or require their employees to have e-mail accounts.
A time-traveler would be an eyewitness to the early 1990s, when
conflicts or cyberspace rights first became a legal issue. In 1990, a
federal court mentioned the term "Internet" for the first time." 6 That
year also witnessed the first criminal conviction of a computer hacker,
who broke into Bell South's 911 computer files.'1 7 The first cybertort
case was decided in 1991, when CompuServe, Inc. was held not liable
for a third party's publication of defamatory statements on its services. 8
In 1991, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit struck
down a one-sided shrink-wrap license agreement, holding that Article 2
113. See MADELEINE SCHACHTER, INFORMATIONAL AND DECISIONAL PRIVACY 3 (2003)
(attributing conceptualization of privacy as right to be left alone to THOMAS M. COOLEY, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (Chicago, Callaghan 1879)). See generally Warren & Brandeis,
supra note 30.
114. John Rothchild, Protecting the Digital Consumer: The Limits of Cyberspace Utopianism, 74
IND. L.J. 893, 917 n.96 (1999) (describing fraudulent Internet sale of investments in time machine).
115. Tim Bemers-Lee developed the World Wide Web at CERN in Switzerland in 1991. It was
not until the mid-I 990s that the World Wide Web reached its takeoff point. See Ben Segal, A Short
History of Internet Protocols at CERN, at http:/wwwinfo.cem.ch/pdp/ns/ben/TCPHIST.html (Apr.
1995).
116. United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 505 (2d Cir. 1991) (upholding conviction of creator
of Internet worm that caused interconnected university computers to crash).
117. United States v. Riggs, 743 F. Supp. 556, 558 (N.D. II1. 1990) (upholding convictions for
wire fraud as well as for violations of Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-474, 100
Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000))).
118. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 137, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (ruling that




of the Uniform Commercial Code applied to software.'1 19
The domain name registration system began to go forward in 1992,
when the National Science Foundation entered into a contract with
Network Solutions, Inc. to develop registration procedures. 120 In 1993, a
federal court became the first to hold a website liable for copyright and
trademark infringement for unauthorized distribution of photographs on
an Internet bulletin board. 121 The next year, a court held for the first time
that mere access to a database in another state was insufficient basis for
personal jurisdiction.122
Since the mid-1990s, parties have litigated thousands of disputes over
trademarks in cyberspace. The first clash between a domain name
registrant and a trademark owner was decided only a decade ago. 123 In
1994, a court held an electronic bulletin board service liable for
contributory copyright infringement for operating a website where users
could download copyrighted video games at no cost. 124 Internet law
historians would surely agree that all of cyberspace legal history has
belonged to the powerful online stakeholders. If Hollywood produced a
film of the history of Internet law, it would be entitled, "Honey, We've
Shrunk the Commons!" 125 The Internet has been used to broadcast
medical images, videos, and provide medical consultations for more than
a decade, yet no tort of telemedicine has evolved. Computerized records
made it possible for financial institutions to provide synchronized access
to far-flung users. Yet there is no case law on the duty of online
companies to protect privacy. Attorneys habitually transmit confidential
client data on the Internet, but there have been no tort actions where
information was intercepted.
In the early years of the World Wide Web, it was not apparent how
existing tort law would pertain to online commerce. Cubby, Inc. v.
119. Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc., v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 99 (3d Cir. 1991) (refusing to
enforce shrink-wrap agreement on grounds that it violated UCC § 2-207's battle of the forms
provision).
120. Antony J. McShane & Orrin S. Shifrin, Protecting Trademarks and Copyrights in the New
Millennium, 14 CBA REC. 32, 32 (Apr. 2000).
121. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1554, 1559, 1561 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
122. Pres-Kap, Inc. v. Sys. One, Direct Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351, 1353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994).
123. See generally MTV Networks v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
124. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Maphia, 857 F. Supp. 679, 689, 690 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
125. See generally Thomas L. Friedman, Honey, I Shrunk the World, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1999,
§ 4, at 19.
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CompuServe Inc., 126 was the first cybertort case where a court
considered whether an ISP was a publisher or distributor for purposes of
defamation law. 127 CompuServe's bulletin board hosted an electronic
newsletter called "Rumorville USA.' 28 The plaintiff began publishing a
rival online publication he called "Skuttlebut."' 129 One of CompuServe's
subscribers posted a statement on Rumorville dismissing the competing
publication as a "start-up" swindle.' 30 The creator of Skuttlebut filed a
defamation action against Rumorville and CompuServe on the theory
that it was a republisher of defamatory content.' CompuServe filed a
motion to dismiss, arguing that it was a distributor without constructive
or actual knowledge of the defamatory communiqu6 on its bulletin
board. 132 CompuServe contended that, because it lacked any opportunity
to screen content, it was a mere distributor. 133
The Cubby court held that CompuServe exercised no editorial control
over materials on its bulletin boards and was therefore a distributor for
purposes of the law of defamation. 134 Because CompuServe had neither
actual nor constructive notice of the defamatory content on Skuttlebut, it
had no liability. 135 In the wake of Cubby, ISPs had a reasonable
expectation that courts would classify them as distributors for third party
content posted on their services.
126. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
127. Id. at 139.
128. Id. at 137.
129. Id. at 138.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 139.
132. Id. Q
133. The court stated:
CompuServe has no opportunity to review Rumorville's contents before DFA uploads it into
CompuServe's computer banks, from which it is immediately available to approved CIS
subscribers. CompuServe receives no part of any fees that DFA charges for access to
Rumorville, nor does CompuServe compensate DFA for providing Rumorville to the
Journalism Forum; the compensation CompuServe receives for making Rumorville available to
its subscribers is the standard online time usage and membership fees charged to all CIS
subscribers, regardless of the information services they use. CompuServe maintains that, before
this action was filed, it had no notice of any complaints about the contents of the Rumorville
publication or about DFA.
Id. at 137.
134. The court was persuaded that CompuServe was a distributor because it exercised almost no
editorial control over anything posted on its message boards or electronic bulletin boards. Id. The
federal court reasoned that, because it exercised no control, it could only be liable for torts if the
plaintiff proved that the 1SP had actual or constructive knowledge of defamatory materials. Id. at
141.
135. Id. at 141.
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The 1995 case of Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.
13 6
muddied the path of cybertort law. Like Cubby, this defamation case
originated from an online denunciation posted on an electronic bulletin
board. One of Prodigy's subscribers posted a message accusing Stratton
Oakmont of fraudulent security offerings. 137 Stratton Oakmont sued the
ISP, demanding $100 million in punitive damages for the cyberslur.'
38
The Stratton Oakmont court ruled that Prodigy could be held liable for
defamatory statements made by its subscribers because it was fulfilling
the classic role of a publisher by screening and preparing content for its
users. 
139
The dissimilar rulings in Cubby and Stratton Oakmont may be
partially explained by the difference in the services that these ISPs
provided to their customers. During the early 1990s, Prodigy carved out
a niche in the Internet mass market by advertising that it offered a safe
Internet that was suitable for family use. 140 Prodigy filtered out
objectionable material and monitored the content on its computer
bulletin boards to promote its family-oriented services. 141 In contrast,
CompuServe did not screen for pornographic or other objectionable
content. 142
Prodigy's gatekeeper role 143 in detecting and screening out
objectionable content made it more vulnerable to claims that it was a
publisher than ISPs like CompuServe that made no effort to screen out
denigrating or even dangerous content. The parties settled the Prodigy
case on October 24, 1995, while an appeal was pending, so the opinion
136. No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
137. Id. at *1.
138. Id.
139. Id. at *4.
140. When Prodigy began its services in 1990, it held itself out as a:
family oriented computer network. In various national newspaper articles written by Geoffrey
Moore, Prodigy's Director of Market Programs and Communications, Prodigy held itself out as
an online service that exercised editorial control over the content of messages posted on its
computer bulletin boards, thereby expressly differentiating itself from its competition and
expressly likening itself to a newspaper.
Id. at *2.
141. Id.
142. CompuServe, Inc. made no effort to monitor content or provide any editorial services. It
loaded text and databases instantaneously without any means to filter out objectionable content.
Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
143. Professors Mann and Winn use the term "gatekeeper liability" to describe the potential
liability an ISP intermediary risks for failing to constrain cyberinfringers, cybercriminals, and
cybertortfeasors. See MANN & WINN, supra note 9, at 188-89.
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has no precedential value. " Stratton Oakmont agreed not to contest
Prodigy's motion to request that the court reverse or set aside its prior
ruling that the ISP was a publisher for purposes of defamation law. 145
As demonstrated by the Cubby and Stratton Oakmont cases, the
common law created a perverse incentive by punishing ISPs that
attempted to protect their subscribers from torts and crimes with liability
as a publisher, 146 while ISPs that did nothing to prevent crimes and torts
were classified as distributors and received limited liability. 147
Dissatisfied with this result, ISPs successfully lobbied Congress to enact
an across-the-board federal immunity that supplanted state defamation
law. In 1996, Congress, through the CDA, expressly overruled Prodigy
by immunizing all online intermediaries from publisher's liability. 148
Congress enacted the CDA to prevent the newborn industry of ISPs from
drowning in a sea of litigation. 14
9
B. The Communications Decency Act
Section 230 of the CDA was a dream come true for ISPs: Congress
made it clear that no interactive computer service would be classified as
a publisher or speaker so long as third parties had provided the
content. 150 The legislative purpose of § 230(b) was to "promote the
continued development of the Internet" and "to preserve the vibrant and
competitive free market that presently exists ... unfettered by Federal or
State regulation."'151 When Congress passed § 230, it recognized that the
Internet provides Americans with "a forum for a true diversity of
political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and
myriad avenues for intellectual activity." 152 While creating protections
for Internet users, Congress sought to preserve these positive attributes
and discourage excessive regulation that might restrain the Internet's
144. Peter H. Lewis, After Apology from Prodigy, Company Drops Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 25,
1995, at D 1.
145. Id.
146. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710, at *4.
147. Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. at 137.
148. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000).
149. See id. § 230(c)(1) (stating, "[n]o provider.., of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider").
150. Id.
151. Id. § 230(b).




By immunizing websites from publisher liability claims, Congress's
enactment of § 230 of the CDA left the victims of defamation without
any meaningful remedy. The common law divided potential defamation
defendants into three categories: "as primary publishers (such as book or
newspaper publishers); as conduits (such as a telephone company); or as
distributors (such as a book store, library, or news dealer)."1 54 Under the
common law of defamation, publishers have maximum exposure to
defamation liability as content providers. 155 The common law of
defamation distinguishes between primary publishers and secondary
distributors of information. Distributors or secondary disseminators,
such as libraries, newsstands, or bookstores, are not liable for defamation
based on objectionable content absent "proof that they knew or had
reason to know of the existence of defamatory matter" contained in the
product they distribute.
1 56
It would be "rather ridiculous, under most circumstances, to expect a
bookseller or a library to withhold distribution of a good book because of
a belief that a derogatory statement contained in the book was both false
and defamatory .... " 157A bookstore, for example, "simply assists
primary publishers in distributing information." 158 Thus, distributors
enjoy limited protection because they are not content creators. In
contrast, "[p]ublishers can be held liable for defamatory statements
contained in their works even absent proof that they had specific
153. Id. § 230(b)(l)-(2).
154. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 166-67 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), review granted and
opinion superseded by 87 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2004).
155. Traditional defamation law
categorized information disseminators into three groups to which very different legal standards
were applied to determine defamation liability related to third-party content: (1) publishers
(e.g., newspapers) exercise great control over final content and were therefore subject to strict
liability; (2) distributors (e.g., booksellers) merely distribute content and were therefore subject
to liability only upon a showing of knowledge or negligence; and (3) common carriers (e.g.,
telephone companies) only transmit information with no control over content and were
therefore not liable at all.
Jae Hong Lee, Note, Batzel v. Smith & Barrett v. Rosenthal: Defamation Liability for Third-Party
Content on the Internet, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 469, 471 (2004); see, e.g., Cubby, Inc. v.
CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (explaining broader liability of publishers
who are treated as content creators versus distributors who are only liable if they have knowledge of
defamatory content).
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knowledge of the statement's inclusion." 159
Because courts have interpreted § 230 to provide ISPs with both
publisher and distributor immunity, 160 an ISP has no duty to perform any
investigation before posting or reposting tortious material and
disseminating it around the world. An ISP could, for example, receive an
e-mail from an unknown source containing obviously defamatory
statements and post it on its website without fear of liability. Even if the
content was clearly tortious on its face, the message would be classified
as "information provided by another information content provider" for
purposes of § 230 immunity. 161 Similarly, the moderator of a listserv or
the operator of a website who posts an allegedly defamatory e-mail
authored by a third party will not be held liable. 162
At present, the targets of consumer fraud or other online injuries have
no recourse against ISPs or other online intermediaries, even if the
service provider has actual knowledge of ongoing torts or crimes on its
services. Courts have flatly refused to strip CDA immunity even when
the ISP has an active role in creating or distributing the content. 63
As a result of § 230, AOL, CompuServe, and Prodigy are immunized
from publisher's liability so long as third parties create the content.'64
The immunity from publisher liability granted by § 230 of the CDA has
continuing vitality a decade after its passage. 165 The development of the
159. KEETON ET AL., supra note 98, § 113, at 810.
160. See, e.g., Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that
publishers and distributors are identical for purposes of defamation law); Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 142, 166-67 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (conferring immunity on ISP for distributor liability),
review granted and opinion superseded by 87 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2004).
161. The CDA defined an "information content provider" as "any person or entity that is
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the
Internet or any other interactive computer service." 47 U.S.C. § 230(0(3) (2000).
162. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031-35 (9th Cir. 2003).
163. For example, in Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998), the court conferred
CDA immunity on AOL for defamation liability, despite the fact that AOL had a written license
agreement with Matt Drudge in which AOL agreed to pay him to produce content for the service. Id.
at 51-52. "The agreement made the Drudge Report available to all members of AOL's service for a
period of one year. In exchange, defendant Drudge received a flat monthly 'royalty payment' of
$3,000 from AOL. During the time relevant to this case, defendant Drudge has had no other source
of income." Id. at 47. AOL also set the terms for Drudge's creation, editing, and management of the
online Drudge report. Id.
164. In passing § 230, "Congress decided not to treat providers of interactive computer services
like other information providers such as newspapers, magazines or television and radio stations, all
of which may be liable for publishing or distributing obscene or defamatory material written or
prepared by others." Id. at 49.
165. The CDA immunity parallels the nineteenth century legal subsidies that insulated the
railroad, steamboat companies, canal builders, and other builders of the nineteenth century industrial
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Internet would have been crippled without this legal shield. Too much
tort liability propagates widespread online censorship, which would
greatly impede freedom of expression on the Internet.
An activist judiciary, however, has radically expanded § 230 by
conferring immunity on distributors. 166 Section 230(c)(1) has been
interpreted to preclude all tort lawsuits against ISPs, websites, and search
engines. 167 Courts have extended the meaning of "interactive computer
services,"' 168 haphazardly lumping together web hosts, websites, search
engines, and content creators into this amorphous category. 1 69 Federal
and state courts have immunized providers from the torts of third parties
predicated on the invasion of privacy, 170 negligence, 171 negligent
misrepresentation, 172 defamation, 173 distributor liability, 174 intentional
economy. See MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 99-
101 (1977).
166. See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 166-67 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), review granted
and opinion superseded by 87 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2004).
167. RUSTAD & DAFTARY, supra note 49, § 5.02[B][2][a], at 5-26 (reporting § 230 cases where
courts expanded immunity for providers).
168. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 2003).
169. See, e.g., Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659, 663 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal of
tort claim that web host aided and abetted sale of secretly obtained video tapes showing undressed
athletes); Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031, 1034-35 (holding that website operator fell within immunity of
§ 230, but remanding issue of whether defamatory e-mail was meant to be posted on listserv); Ben
Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. America Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding
Internet access provider was immunized for providing access to misleading stock information);
OptInRealBig.com, LLC v. IronPort Sys., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1047 (N.D. Cal. 2004)
(denying injunction in favor of spam e-mailer, ruling that spain complaint website was immunized
from liability under CDA); Ramey v. Darkside Prods., No. CIV.A.02-730 (GK), 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10107, at *12-21 (D.D.C. May 17, 2004) (ruling that online advertising guide for adult
entertainment was immunized by CDA in claim by woman that unauthorized photos were used on
advertisement on website); PatentWizard, Inc. v. Kinko's, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1072 (D.S.D.
2001) (extending CDA immunity to copy center that permitted third-party users to send e-mails and
other electronic communications anonymously).
170. Does 1 Through 30 Inclusive v. Franco Prods., 99 C 7885, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8645, at
*10-16 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 2000), affdsub nom. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003).
171. Doe v. America Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010, 1013-17 (Fla. 2001) (dismissing case filed by
parent of young boy seduced after being contacted by pedophile in AOL chat room); Jane Doe One
v. Oliver, 755 A.2d 1000, 1003-04 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000) (holding AOL immune from improper
e-mail messages sent to plaintiff mother's employer), aff'd, 792 A.2d 911 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
172. Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 108 Wash. App. 454, 458, 467, 31 P.3d 37, 39, 43 (2001).
173. See, e.g., Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co., 206 F.3d at 984-86 (holding defendant ISP immune
from suit pursuant to § 230 because AOL was not "publisher or speaker" of defamatory speech);
Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding § 230 protects ISP from
liability for defamatory speech initiated by third party); Smith v. Intercosmos Media Group, Inc.,
No. CIV.A.02-1964 sec. C, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24251, at *7-12 (E.D. La. Dec. 17, 2002)
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infliction of emotional distress, 175 and for spam lawsuits.1 76 The courts,
however, have steadfastly refused to extend immunity to trademark or
copyright infringement occurring on websites.117
When interpreting § 230, courts have consistently classified Internet
defendants as conduits even when they play an active editorial role. 178
Nearly all courts rule that ISPs are not liable for defamation, even if they
perform "traditional editorial functions-such as deciding whether to
publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content."'179 In Batzel v. Smith, 80 the
(denying relief for defamation, libel, or negligence based on allegedly defamatory websites set up by
its customers); PatentWizard, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d at 1071-72 (ruling provider was not liable for
anonymous Internet user's disparaging remarks about plaintiffs' software in chat room session
where plaintiffs were unable to determine identity of user because provider did not record identities
of persons who rented its computers); Marczeski v. Law, 122 F. Supp. 2d 315, 326-28 (D. Conn.
2000) (holding individual defendants who created chat room were immunized by § 230); see also
Schneider, 108 Wash. App. at 467, 31 P.3d at 43 (dismissing defamation lawsuit against
Amazon.com for third party's posting of negative comments about author's book on site).
174. Green v. America Online, Inc., 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2002); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
175. Whether a wrong rises to the requisite level of outrageousness and egregiousness to sustain a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is a question of law. If the evidence shows that
reasonable persons might find the presence of extreme and outrageous conduct and resulting severe
emotional distress, a jury then must find the facts and make its own determination. To support the
emotional distress allegation, the conduct must have been so abusive or obscene as naturally to
humiliate, embarrass, frighten, or extremely outrage a plaintiff. Ramey v. Darkside Prods., Inc.,
No. CIV.A.02-730 (GK), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10107, at *12-18 (D.D.C. May 17, 2004)
(granting summary judgment in favor of publisher of online advertising guide for adult
entertainment on tort claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, unjust enrichment,
negligence, and fraud).
176. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding federal statutory immunity
available to Internet intermediaries under 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2000) applies only when "a
reasonable person in the position of the service provider or user would conclude that the information
was provided for publication on the Internet or other 'interactive computer service"');
OptlnRealBig.com, LLC v. IronPort Sys., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1047 (N.D. Cal. 2004)
(holding CDA immunizes anti-spain software company from liability).
177. A court rejected a website's contention that it was classified as an interactive computer
service provider and thus was protected from liability for the trademark infringement of its
customers. Ford Motor Co. v. GreatDomains.com, Inc., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1446, 1447 (E.D.
Mich. 2001). However, as the court noted, § 230 of the CDA expressly provides that "nothing in this
section shall be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property." Id.; see 47
U.S.C. § 230(e)(2).
178. See, e.g., Stoner v. eBay, Inc., No. 305666, 2000 WL 1705637, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 1,
2000) (classifying online auction website as interactive computer service provider even though site
does not enable access to Internet and exercises editorial control and monitoring); Schneider, 108
Wash. App. at 465-67, 31 P.3d at 42-43 (extending immunity to online bookstore which posts
reviews of books by readers and has searchable database where people locate and purchase books).
179. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330, 331; see, e.g., Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031 (vacating district court order
denying website operator's anti-SLAPP motion and remanding to district court for further
proceedings to evaluate what provider should have reasonably concluded at time he received e-
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court noted that the congressional exclusion of "publisher" liability for
third-party content also shields providers for "the usual prerogative of
publishers to choose among proffered material and to edit the material
published while retaining its basic form and message."'' Courts have
conflated distributors' liability with publishers' liability, blithely
ignoring distinctions developed over centuries of tort law.
The courts' expansive interpretation of § 230 has resulted in an
inhospitable legal environment for consumers in cyberspace. Some of
the injustices caused by § 230 decisions are shocking in the extreme, just
like the iniquitous results of the common law rule that there is no duty to
aid one in peril. 8 2 A gold medalist swimmer, for example, "with a boat
and a rope at hand, who sees another drowning before his eyes, is not
required to do anything at all about it."' 83
Modem courts impose a duty on innocent injurers to assist their
victims who have been placed in a position of peril.' 84 When a website
realizes that its services have created a condition involving an
unreasonable risk of a cybertort, it should also have a duty to mitigate
damages. Websites are not necessarily mere pipes or conduits; they also
play a role in creating or enabling cybertorts or infringement.
Websites can facilitate defamation, pornography, and wholesale
invasions of privacy without the risk of tort liability. The harsh effects of
nineteenth century no-duty rules were toned down by doctrines such as
the duty of common carriers to take reasonable steps to save passengers
in peril.' 85 Under maritime law, a ship's captain has a duty to save a
seaman who has fallen overboard.' 86 ISPs are the modem-day functional
equivalent of common carriers in cyberspace, and they should have a
responsibility to come to the aid of website visitors and customers when
mail); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. America Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000)
(reasoning "Congress clearly enacted § 230 to forbid the imposition of publisher liability on a
service provider for the exercise of its editorial and self-regulatory functions"); Blumenthal v.
Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52 (D.D.C. 1998) (interpreting § 230 as immunizing providers for exercise
of editorial and self-regulatory functions).
180. 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003).
181. Id. at 1031.
182. KEETON ET AL., supra note 98, § 56, at 375 (noting that there is no legal duty to come "to the
aid of another human being who is in danger, even if the other is in danger of losing his life").
183. Id.
184. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 321 cmt. a (1965) (noting there is duty whether
original act is tortious or innocent).
185. KEETON ET AL., supra note 98, § 56, at 376.
186. Id.
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they have well-defined notice of continuing crimes and torts on their
services.
The unintended consequence of immunizing all ISPs from tort
liability is that this confers an absolute immunity on feral ISPs that harm
the public. In Ramey v. Darkside Productions, Inc.,187 an online adult
services website published unauthorized sexually explicit photographs of
the plaintiff in its Eros Guide, using content supplied by a customer.
1 88
The court ruled that the pornographic website was immunized from
liability for the plaintiffs tort claims, even though it had actual notice
that the photographs infringed the intellectual property rights of the
exotic dancer. 89 The Darkside court described the § 230(c) "immunity
as quite robust, adopting a relatively expansive definition of 'interactive
computer service' and a relatively restrictive definition of 'information
content provider."' 190 The website compartmentalized its adult
entertainment content and even placed a watermark on the unauthorized
photographs. 19' Despite these compelling facts, the court ruled that the
federal immunity for publishers applied, granted summary judgment in
favor of the pornographer, and left the plaintiff with no redress for her
injuries. 192
In OptInRealBig.com, LLC v. IronPort Systems, Inc., 193 a spain e-
mailer sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin SpamCop.net 194 from
publishing reports about alleged spammers and eradicating e-mail
addresses of those complaining about spain. 95 The bulk e-mailer alleged
that the anti-spam program 196 inflated the complaints against it and
187. 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10107 (D.D.C. May 17, 2004).
188. Id. at *6.
189. Id. at*16-18.
190. Id. at *20.
191. Id. at *5-6.
192. Id. at *20.
193. 323 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
194. The court described SpamCop as:
an interactive Internet-based service whose mission is to reduce spam by reporting complaints
to ISPs that provide Internet access to the senders of spam ("spammers"). Whereas many anti-
spam companies provide filtering services, which blocks [sic] an anti-spaie customer from
receiving spare, SpamCop goes one step further. It forwards complaints to ISPs to encourage
ISPs to sanction spammers, including cutting off the spammers [sic] bandwidth (e.g. their
access to the Internet).... SpamCop's founder, Julian Haight, has stated that he has helped
close many spammers' e-mail accounts.
Id. at 1040 (citations omitted).
195. Id. at 1038-39.
196. "Plaintiff in this case, Optln, is in the business of sending bulk commercial e-mails.
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caused ISPs to reduce the bandwidth it needed to run its business.
197
Optln charged that the anti-spam company was intentionally interfering
with its contracts, 198 was defaming its business reputation, 199 and
constituted unfair competition. °°
The federal district court ruled that Optln was not entitled to a
preliminary injunction because the spain reduction business is immune
from publisher's liability under the CDA, despite the fact that SpamCop
exercised many traditional functions of publishers. 20 1 The court held that
the anti-spam company was an ISP that used interactive computer
services to distribute its online mailing, post reports from registered
users, and send report copies to non-subscribers.20 2 The court immunized
the defendant, even though it was aggressive in its mailings, because it
had not altered the content of the messages it received.20 3 While the
result in this case benefited consumers by restraining spain, overly broad
immunities generally work to the advantage of online pornographers,
spain e-mailers, vendors of bogus goods, forged financial services, and
pyramid schemers.
Defendant, SpamCop, is in the business of collecting complaints from recipients of alleged spam
and forwarding these complaints to Internet Service Providers ('ISPs') who supply Internet
bandwidth to the purported spammers." Id. at 1039.
197. Id.
198. A plaintiff claiming interference with prospective economic advantage must prove:
(1) the existence of an economic relationship between the plaintiffand a third party; (2) that the
defendant was aware of the relationship and acted wrongfully with the purpose of disrupting
the relationship; (3) that the relationship was disrupted; and (4) that the plaintiff suffered
damages that flow proximately from the disruption. The wrongful act must be conduct that was
wrongful by some legal measure other than the fact of interference itself.
Id. at 1049 (citations omitted).
199. To prevail in a claim for trade libel, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant: (1) made
a statement that disparages the quality of the plaintiff's product; (2) that the offending statement was
couched as fact, not opinion; (3) that the statement was false; (4) that the statement was made with
malice; and (5) that the statement resulted in monetary loss. Id. at 1048.
200. Id. at 1039.
201. The court ruled that SpamCop was immune because it was classified as an interactive
computer service. Id. at 1051-52. The court noted that, even if the defendant was not immune, it
would deny the injunction because the e-mail business was not likely to succeed on the merits of its
claims, it was unclear whether the e-mail business's harm emanated from the spam complaint
business's acts, and the public interest in protecting privacy and free speech outweighed whatever
risks the e-mail business faced. Id.
202. Id. at 1047.
203. Id.
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C. Cybertort Law Is Not Settled Until It Is Settled Right
In Zeran v. America Online, Inc.,2°4 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit expanded the scope of CDA immunity by ruling that
§ 230 abolished distributor liability even when the ISP has knowledge of
the defamatory content. 205 The World Wide Web would grind to a halt if
ISPs were required to monitor all e-mail or Internet communications on
their services.20 6 An ISP is frequently in the position of being merely a
distributor of content to its subscribers. AOL, for example, contracts
with content providers to provide its subscribers with special features
such as musical concerts, online chats with celebrities, and sporting
events. It merely posts content supplied by third parties; it does not
monitor the materials. ISPs need some protection against liability, but
the current legal regime is tilted too far in their favor.
This imbalance in favor of ISPs is clearly demonstrated in cases like
Zeran v. America Online, Inc. In Zeran, the court affirmed summary
judgment in favor of an ISP on the grounds of § 230 immunity in a case
in which an impostor posted defamatory messages on the ISP's bulletin
board.20 7 The sham posting accused the plaintiff, Ken Zeran, of selling
offensive t-shirts celebrating the Oklahoma City bombing. 208 Zeran
received hundreds of threatening telephone calls, flaming e-mails, and
209death threats as a result of the phony postings.
AOL did not promptly remove the false listings, refused to retract the
sham postings, and did not take steps to block further defamatory
postings by the impostor. 210 The Zeran court ruled that AOL could not
be held liable because it was entitled to immunity as either a publisher or
a distributor of defamatory statements posted on its service. 211 The court
204. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
205. Id. at 332.
206. As the Zeran court noted:
The specter of tort liability in an area of such prolific speech would have an obvious chilling
effect. It would be impossible for service providers to screen each of their millions of postings
for possible problems. Faced with potential liability for each message republished by their
services, interactive computer service providers might choose to severely restrict the number
and type of messages posted.
Id. at 331.
207. Id. at 328.
208. Id. at 329.
209. Id. at 330.
210. Id. at 329.
211. Id. at 332 (ruling that "AOL is legally considered to be a publisher" and that "[e]ven
distributors are considered to be publishers for purposes of defamation law").
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found the long-standing common law differentiation between publisher
and distributor liability to be a distinction without a difference.21 2 The
court refused to consider AOL as either a publisher or distributor, despite
the ISP's notice of tortious activity on its services: "Assuming arguendo
that Zeran has satisfied the requirements for imposition of distributor
liability, this theory of liability is merely a subset, or a species, of
publisher liability, and is therefore also foreclosed by § 230.,,213
The Zeran court feared that, "[i]f computer service providers were
subject to distributor liability, they would face potential liability each
time they receive notice of a potentially defamatory statement-from
any party, concerning any message." 214 The court's concern that
imposing distributor liability on ISPs would result in legal overkill is
unsupported by any empirical research. During centuries of common law
development, the rule of distributor liability has never produced a flood
of claims. The vast majority of courts follow Zeran in granting broad
immunity to providers even when they have an active role in distributing
defamatory materials provided by third parties for publication. 215 ISPs
also have no liability for third party content, even if they can easily
render inoperative those website postings that are known to be illegal.
Courts have granted publisher's immunity to ISPs that were clearly
more than mere content distributors. For example, in Blumenthal v.
212. The court stated:
The terms "publisher" and "distributor" derive their legal significance from the context of
defamation law. ... Because the publication of a statement is a necessary element in a
defamation action, only one who publishes can be subject to this form of tort
liability.... Publication does not only describe the choice by an author to include certain
information. In addition, both the negligent communication of a defamatory statement and the




214. Id. at 333.
215. See, e.g., Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2003)
(extending immunity to online dating service that collected, categorized and organized information
provided by third parties); Green v. America Online, Inc., 318 F.3d 465, 471-72 (3d Cir. 2003)
(rejecting plaintiff's argument that AOL was divested of its § 230 immunity "because AOL's
Community Guidelines outline standards for online speech and conduct and contain promises that
AOL would protect [plaintiM from other subscribers"); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. America
Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985-86 (10th Cir. 2000) (refusing to strip ISP of § 230 immunity in
negligence-based lawsuit for inaccurate stock quotations even when provider played editorial role
by making editorial deletions and corrections); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 51-53
(D.D.C. 1998) (holding service provider immune from liability even though it paid online political
gossip for information and promoted content on its services).
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Drudge,21 6 the court held that AOL was entitled to immunity despite
fulfilling many roles of a primary publisher.217 AOL was inoculated from
defamation liability as a § 230 provider, despite the fact that the ISP had
an exclusive contract to electronically publish Matt Drudge's political
gossip column on its services.21 8
In this case, White House aide Sidney Blumenthal filed a defamation
case against AOL and Matt Drudge after Drudge erroneously reported
that Blumenthal had a "spousal abuse past." AOL and Drudge promptly
published a retraction of the cybersmear. 219 The court dismissed AOL
from the case after classifying the company as an ISP immunized by
§ 230.220 The plaintiff charged that AOL was a distributor masquerading
as a mere conduit. 22' The court rebuffed that contention, stating that
"[any attempt to distinguish between 'publisher' liability and notice-
based 'distributor' liability and to argue that Section 230 was only
intended to immunize the former would be unavailing. 222 The court
concluded that "the statutory language is clear: AOL is immune from
suit" as either a publisher or distributor.223
The trial judge conceded that it was an injustice to not hold a service
provider responsible where it was clearly more like a disguised publisher
than a true conduit for third-party content:
If it were writing on a clean slate, this Court would agree with
plaintiffs. AOL has certain editorial rights with respect to the
content provided by Drudge and disseminated by AOL,
including the right to require changes in content and to remove
it; and it has affirmatively promoted Drudge as a new source of
unverified instant gossip on AOL. Yet it takes no responsibility
for any damage he may cause. AOL is not a passive conduit like
the telephone company, a common carrier with no control and
therefore no responsibility for what is said over the telephone
wires. Because it has the [right] to exercise editorial control over
216. 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
217. Matt Drudge and AOL entered into an exclusive license agreement that "made the Drudge
Report available to all members of AOL's service for a period of one year. In exchange, defendant
Drudge received a flat monthly 'royalty payment' of $3,000 from AOL." Id. at 47.
218. Id. at 50.
219. Id. at48.
220. Id. at 51.
221. See id. at47, 50.
222. Id. at 52.
223. Id. at 53.
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those with whom it contracts and whose words it disseminates, it
would seem only fair to hold AOL to the liability standards
applied to a publisher or, at least, like a book store owner or
library, to the liability standards applied to a distributor.224
Individual plaintiffs will not have realistic cybertort remedies until the
scope of § 230 of the CDA is scaled back to Congress's original intent of
insulating providers from claims for publisher's liability arising out of
third-party content.
D. A Possible New Path for Cybertort Law
This is a propitious moment to revisit the matter of ISP tort liability.
The California Court of Appeal recently noted that most scholars believe
that the expansive reading of § 230 "is flawed in that the court ascribed
to Congress an intent to create a far broader immunity than that body
actually had in mind or is necessary to achieve its purposes. 225 The
Supreme Court of California has granted a petition for review to
consider the reach of § 230 in a case where the ISP was more than a
passive conduit, engaging in many traditional editorial functions though
falling short of being the primary content creator.226
In Barrett v. Rosenthal,227 a California court of appeal became the
first U.S. court to hold that § 230 does not immunize an ISP that
republishes defamatory statements authored by a third party after the
website acquires knowledge that the statements were false.228 The appeal
court's milestone decision adopted the common law rule that distributors
are liable for transferring defamatory information if they have
224. Id. at 51-52.
225. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 154 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (citations omitted),
review granted and opinion superseded by 87 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2004).
226. The court stated:
In addition to the issues set forth in the petition for review, the court requests the parties to
include briefing on the following questions: (1) What is the meaning of the term "user" under
section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (47 U.S.C. section 230)? (2) For purposes of
the issue presented by this case, does it matter whether a user engaged in active or passive
conduct?
Barrett v. Rosenthal, 87 P.3d 797, 797 (Cal. 2004) (order granting review).
227. 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), review granted and opinion superseded by 87 P.3d
797 (Cal. 2004).
228. Id. at 154. "Since the decision in Zeran, no court has subjected a provider or user of an
interactive computer service to notice liability for disseminating third-party defamatory statements




knowledge of its objectionable content. 229 The Supreme Court of
California granted a petition for review after the court of appeal vacated
in part and otherwise affirmed an order granting a special motion to
strike.230
In Barrett, plaintiffs Stephen Barrett and Terry Polevoy, two medical
doctors, were "primarily engaged in combating the promotion and use of
'alternative' or 'nonstandard' healthcare practices and products. 23 ' The
physicians maintained Internet "[w]eb sites that expos[ed] 'health frauds
and quackery' and provid[ed]" consumers with information about health
care alternatives.232 One defendant, Rosenthal, was an alternative health
practitioner who reprinted and distributed a number of bogus charges
against the plaintiff physicians.233
The defendant's web postings charged the two doctors with running a
"Slea[z]y 'Quack buster' Scam,, 234 and charged that Dr. Polevoy stalked
women. 23 Rosenthal refused to withdraw the antagonistic postings and
posted thirty-two additional messages on Internet newsgroups
denouncing the doctors' threatened litigation. 236 These messages
included a copy of the original allegedly defamatory message or a
reference back to that message and referred to the doctors as, among
other things, "quacks. 237
After the defendant rebuffed requests to remove the denigrating
messages, the plaintiffs filed suit for libel, conspiracy, and libel per se.238
The trial court dismissed their complaint because it contravened
California's anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation) statute, which protects a defendant's right of free speech if
a plaintiffs cause of action arises from protected activity. 239 The courtfound inadequate evidence that the defendant's defamatory statements
229. Id. at 152 (holding that CDA does not "abrogate the common law principle that one who
republishes defamatory matter originated by a third person is subject to liability if he or she knows
or has reason to know of its defamatory character") (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 581 (1)) (emphasis in original).
230. Barrett, 87 P.3d at 797; Barrett, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 167.
231. Barrett, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3dat 144.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 144-45.
234. Id. at 146.
235. Id. at 145.
236. Id. at 146.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 145-46.
239. Id. at 146.
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had harmed the plaintiffs' reputational interests.24 °
The California Court of Appeal affirmed the application of the anti-
SLAPP statute as to Dr. Barrett, but not as to Dr. Polevoy. 24' The court
found that the trial court went astray in requiring Dr. Polevoy to
demonstrate actual damages because the defamatory language posted on
the website was libel per se.242 The court held that the federal immunity
granted by § 230 was inapt because Rosenthal was a "user of an
interactive computer service" and a primary publisher who was strictly
liable for defamatory statements.243 The court ruled that § 230 does not
"abrogate the common law principle that one who republishes
defamatory matter originated by a third person is subject to [distributor]
liability if he or she knows or has reason to know of its defamatory
character."
244
The Barrett appellate court flatly declined to follow the Zeran court's
reasoning that § 230 "immunized providers and users of interactive
computer services from liability not only as primary publishers but also
as distributors. 245 The Barrett court noted that § 230, on its face, does
not clearly address whether Congress intended to overthrow the well-
established common law principle of distributor liability.246 The court
found no evidence that Congress intended § 230 immunity to extend to
distributors with knowledge.247 The Barrett court held that providers or
users who knowingly distribute defamatory materials produced by third
parties should be subject to liability.248
If the Supreme Court of California affirms the appellate court, it will
further demonstrate that "the common law [is] at its best in
accommodating change within the framework of continuity., 249 This
case may well be a bellwether decision that will reshape online
intermediary law. The court may conclude that Congress intended § 230
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 146-47.
243. Id. at 151-52.
244. Id. at 152 (emphasis in original) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581(1)
(1977)).
245. Id. at 153 (emphasis omitted).
246. Id. at 155-56.
247. Id. at 156.
248. Id. at 160-61.
249. Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., Tort Liability for Psychic Injuries: Overview and Update, 37 ATLA
L.J. 1, 27 (1978).
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to encompass absolute immunity for third party communications as
either publishers or distributors, even if the ISP is engaged in active
conduct such as editing, screening, or commissioning content. The trend
of online intermediary law points in this direction. Alternatively, the
court could construe § 230 to immunize an ISP as a publisher but not a
distributor, which is consistent with the CDA's statutory language.
A decision by the Supreme Court of California that downsizes § 230
would open the door to a greatly needed radical reconsideration of the
duty of care in cyberspace. Interactive computer services should not be
absolved of all responsibility when they have actual knowledge of
defamatory postings or e-mails. Similarly, when a website operator has
knowledge that a posting overruns the privacy or tarnishes the reputation
of a computer user, it should have a duty to retract the deprecating
publication or prevent further tortious or criminal activity.
Imposing limited liability is only the first step toward making ISPs
more accountable to the public for excessive preventable dangers in
cyberspace. When losses are placed on the online intermediaries, the
total price tag to society is lowered. For example, an ISP is in the
preeminent position to publish cost-efficient retractions of defamatory
communications that will result in more truthful information being
provided to the public. In the case of an Internet trade libel, an ISP's
prompt action will decrease the radius of the financial injury and lessen
losses from trade libel such as plummeting stock market values. Limited
liability will induce ISPs to expand system-wide products to protect all
users from viruses, spyware, spam, and security holes. Online
intermediaries are in the best position to calibrate Internet security to the
radius of the risk and in proportion to the peril because they are
generally the first to detect the problem.
Once ISP immunity is reduced, it is likely that courts will begin to
impose a duty of care on online information providers to act sensibly in
protecting their customers from third-party crimes and torts. Requiring
ISPs to take down abhorrent materials, such as the secret videotapes of
the college athletes, will steadily grind down the liability-free zone that
these entities currently enjoy. The overall rate of tort injuries to
consumers will be diminished if ISPs have an inducement to implement
security solutions to detect and thwart cybercriminals. For example, the
computer industry has already developed systems of deception, such as
decoys, "fly traps," and "honeypots," in order to trap unwary computer
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intruders. 250 The imposition of a greater duty of care will rekindle
research into how to plug security holes, trap cybercriminals, block
spam, disable pornographic pop-ups, and stifle the growth of website
creepy crawlers.
III. THE INJURY PROBLEM FOR "ONE-SHOTTERS" IN
CYBERSPACE
Our statistical analysis clearly demonstrates that online consumers
and many other victims of cyberspace harms have been unable to obtain
redress through traditional tort law. Consumer actions against online
sellers and service providers are simply missing from the litigation
landscape. The lack of consumer victories can largely be explained by
the problem of locating the primary wrongdoer and, as shown in Part II,
the immunity enjoyed by most Internet sellers.
This Part develops the case for creating stronger remedies for
consumers and other computer users to redress online injuries. The
World Wide Web provides a cross-national instrumentality for online
defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and other
Internet-related wrongdoing that is unlikely to be punished. The misuse
of the Internet has created a "tragedy of the anti-commons. ,251 Without
effective enforcement of consumer rights and remedies, the Internet will
not fulfill its promise as a secure marketplace for procuring goods or
services.
A. ISPs Have No Duty to Cooperate with Injured Consumers
This blanket ISP immunity for hosting or posting the content provided
by third parties has resulted in numerous injustices. Not only are ISPs
immune from lawsuits for hosting or posting third party content, but also
they have no legal duty to cooperate with the plaintiff in tracking down
cybercriminals. The absolute immunity given to web hosts and other
providers makes it all but impossible for plaintiffs to learn more about
the role of ISPs in creating, developing, or designing websites or web
pages where tortious activities are taking place.
In Doe v. GTE Corp.,252 for example, three different corporations
250. ISP Planet, Intrusion Detection Services Directory, at http://isp-planet.com/services/ids (last
visited Mar. 12, 2005).
251. Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L.
REv. 439, 442 (2003).
252. 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003).
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provided Internet access and web hosting services for Franco
Productions, a pornographer that sold unauthorized tapes of college
athletes filmed secretly while they were showering or dressing.253 The
victims learned of the existence of films such as Voyeur Time and
Between the Lockers from a newspaper story about the adult services
website.254 The federal court of appeals ruled that the college athletes
had no cause of action against the ISPs that had profited from hosting the
adult services websites.2 5 The imposition of distributor liability would
give these athletes and the many other victims of online misconduct a
right to have illegal or objectionable material removed.
The plaintiffs were not even able to obtain discovery to determine
how extensively GTE and the other web hosts participated in "designing
or creating or maintaining the web site, ranging anywhere from
completely creating, writing, organizing and originally editing content
before it is posted and changing, updating, adding or deleting content
thereafter, to providing the template or architecture of the web site. ' 256
At present, courts typically will dismiss service providers from tort
actions filed against them early in the litigation, prior to discovery. In
many cybertort cases involving a third-party criminal, a plaintiff will be
unable to use discovery to uncover what the service provider knew about
prior similar incidents or whether it had a contract or other close
connection to the anonymous defendant.257
Discovery generally cannot be deployed to establish whether a
website operator or service provider aided or abetted a third-party
253. The federal district court described the case as involving
intercollegiate athletes who, without their knowledge or consent, were videotaped in various
states of undress by hidden cameras in restrooms, locker rooms, or showers. The resulting
videotapes were sold by various means, including web sites hosted by Genuity.net and
TIAC.Net that included still images of the [p]laintiffs taken from the videotapes.
Does I Through 30 Inclusive v. Franco Prods., No. 99 C 7885, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8645, at *2
(N.D. I11. June 22, 2000), affd sub nom. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003).
254. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 656.
255. The district court dismissed all claims against the providers, citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)
(2000). GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 657-62. "After the judgment became final with the resolution or
dismissal of all claims against all other defendants-the defaulting defendants were ordered to pay
more than $500 million." Id. at 656-57 (citing Franco Prods., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24032, at *2-
3). The $500 million judgment is uncollectable because the adult services defendants vanished. Id.
at 657.
256. Franco Prods., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8645, at *7.
257. Microsoft, for example, made a corporate decision to shut down its chat rooms after learning
that these sites were notorious venues for the stalking of children by pedophiles. Charles Arthur,
Microsoft Closes Chat Rooms to Curb Pedophile Threat, INDEPENDENT (London), Sept. 23, 2003, at
I (reporting closure of United Kingdom chat rooms used by 1.2 million visitors per month).
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cybercriminal or tortfeasor who used its services to sell illegal content.258
For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in Ben
Ezra, Weinstein, & Co., Inc. v. America Online, Inc.,259 affirmed a
federal magistrate's order denying discovery on the grounds of § 230
immunity. 260 In Ben Ezra, the magistrate judge ruled that the plaintiff did
not sufficiently respond to the service provider's summary judgment
motion and thus had failed to demonstrate why further discovery should
be allowed.2 61 Early dismissal from these cases means that a plaintiff
will typically be unable to learn whether the service provider was
connected closely enough to the third party to be unclothed of its
immunity.
If § 230 immunity were limited to protection from publisher's
liability, a wronged consumer could obtain further discovery in cases
where a service provider had actual knowledge of ongoing crimes or
torts. Prolonged discovery in cases where the ISP is classified as a
distributor will enable plaintiffs to uncover more information about the
nature, nexus, and extent of prior crimes and torts on websites. Plaintiffs
could use the locomotive of discovery to unearth aggravating factors,
such as whether the ISP profited by being too closely connected to
fraudulent schemes that injured consumers. Discovery in these cases
might even result in ISPs or websites being stripped of their immunity as
primary publishers because of a close connection to the creators of
illegal content. If ISPs were liable as distributors with knowledge, the
gravamen of a case would shift to determining how much the web host
or service provider knew about the dishonest scheme and when they
knew it.
B. ISPs Are in the Best Position to Prevent Cybertort Injuries
This expansive immunity is a great source of inefficiency in the U.S.
258. In John Does 1 Through 30 Inclusive v. Franco Productions, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8645,
(N.D. Ill. June 22, 2000), affid sub nom. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003), the
plaintiffs argued that without further discovery about the creation and development of the website,
they could not determine the role of the web host in the sale of secret tapes of college athletes in
various stages of undress. Id. at *7-8. The plaintiffs request for discovery was rejected because the
court dismissed this defendant from the lawsuit. Id. at * 16, * 19.
259. 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2002).
260. Id. at 984 (holding that because it was undisputed that AOL fit within § 230's definition of




legal system because ISPs are normally in the preeminent position to
deter cyberstalking and other blameworthy activities of their Internet
customers. An ISP, for example, will have a log of Internet activity that
is a valuable resource for tracking down primary wrongdoers. If an ISP
had a legal responsibility to remove defamatory postings, it could easily
mitigate damages by terminating the cybercriminal's account, and
auditing his illegal activities; this would eliminate ongoing patterns of
fraud, such as those in the Yahoo! automobile sales website.
ISPs and websites should have a duty to disable sites where they have
actual notice of ongoing deceitful sales and services. Just as a telephone
company has records of calls or other subscriber information, an ISP is
typically in the best position to keep logs, subscriber information, and
software audits of anomalies. A service provider is typically the first to
learn of network intrusions or spoofing because it monitors packets
traversing its system. An ISP also will be the first to discover attempted
break-ins by cybercriminals and can use port scans to mitigate the
damage caused by intrusions.
C. Limiting ISP Immunity Would Help Solve the Injury Problem
Our synoptic sketch of ISP defamation cases demonstrates the need to
limit the CDA's unconditional immunity for third-party postings. If the
common law "distributor with knowledge rule" were extended to
cyberspace, AOL would be liable for not taking prompt remedial actions
in both the Zeran and Blumenthal v. Drudge cases. Zeran would have an
action against AOL for failing to take down the defamatory materials or
blocking the reposting of material known to be objectionable. In
addition, there would be liability for failing to publish a retraction to
repair Zeran's reputation. In the Blumenthal case, the plaintiff would be
permitted to conduct further discovery about AOL's editorial role in its
electronic publication of the Drudge Report. If AOL played a major role
in the cooperative creation of content, it would be stripped of its
immunity. AOL would have constructive knowledge that Drudge's
posting was defamatory and would be held liable as a distributor under
262the "constructive notice" doctrine of the common law of defamation.
262. The distributor with notice rule would make a telegraph company, for example, liable as a
secondary publisher or distributor "if, but only if, it knew or had reason to know that the sender was
not privileged to send the message." KEETON ET AL., supra note 98, § 113, at 811. There is a
distinction between constructive and actual knowledge of defamatory content. If the constructive or
actual notice rule applied to AOL, it would likely be liable for Drudge's communication. When it
contracted with Drudge to exclusively publish his column online, AOL had constructive knowledge
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It is difficult to believe that, when it enacted § 230, Congress meant to
grant an unqualified safe harbor for websites that are closely connected
to fraudulent schemes or illegal content. The Zeran court's interpretation
of the CDA not only "mischaracterizes the defamation common law, but
it also assumes that Congress had the same oversight., 263 AOL clearly
would have been liable as a distributor if the court had accurately
construed the statutory language of § 230 because Congress never
mentions distributors. AOL should have been held liable under the
common law because it had either constructive or actual knowledge of
Drudge's defamatory content.
These cases document the rationale for limiting ISP immunity by
imposing the distributor with notice rule. 264 This Article proposes that
service providers be held responsible for minimizing injuries sustained
by their customers so that ISPs have an incentive to increase Internet
265 mo
security. This modest tort reform will help to put cybertort law in
motion by requiring that an ISP take on a more dynamic role in
preventing ongoing torts in cyberspace. Overly broad immunities have
historically encouraged corporate irresponsibility and this pattern
continues to this very day.266
that it was a political gossip column. The ISP may not have had actual knowledge that Drudge's
content was defamatory, but it is arguable that AOL should be stripped of its immunity as a
publisher because of its editorial role in shaping the content and website. Further discovery would
be required to know whether AOL had actual knowledge about Drudge's derogatory
communications about Blumenthal.
263. Sewali K. Patel, Note, Immunizing Internet Service Providers from Third-Party Internet
Defamation Claims: How Far Should Courts Go?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 647, 682 (2002).
264. This is also the approach adopted by the intermediate court in Barrett v. Rosenthal, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 416, 436-38 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that § 230 did not abrogate common law
principle that one who republished defamatory matter originated by third person was subject to
liability if he or she knew or had reason to know of its defamatory character), vacated on other
grounds by 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
265. ISP Planet, supra note 250 (explaining that ISP is frequently in best position to detect
unauthorized changes to maximize security).
266. After World War II, jurisdiction after jurisdiction abrogated the draconian spousal immunity
because it led to frequent injustices. Maryland, for example, abolished interspousal immunity in a
case where a husband participated in the gunpoint gang-rape of his wife. Lusby v. Lusby, 390 A.2d
77, 77-78, 88-89 (Md. 1978); see also Self v. Self, 376 P.2d 65, 65, 70 (Cal. 1962) (abolishing
spousal immunity in case where husband broke wife's arm in assault and battery); Small v.
Rockfeld, 330 A.2d 335, 336-37, 344-45 (N.J. 1974) (holding that neither interspousal, nor parent-
child immunity barred grandmother's action against her son-in-law for reckless misconduct leading
to death of her daughter, defendant's wife). During that same period, there was a movement in the
states to abolish governmental immunity. See, e.g., Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d
130, 131, 133 (Fla. 1957) (en banc) (holding city liable for wrongful death of plaintiff unattended by
police in jail cell); Jones v. State Highway Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225,226-27 (Mo. 1977) (en banc)
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IV. REFORMING ONLINE INTERMEDIARY LAW
As documented in Part I, the field of cybertorts has yet to recognize
remedies for negligence-based or strict liability actions. Trial lawyers
have organized nearly seventy litigation groups to share knowledge and
discovery in particular substantive areas such as workplace injury,
tobacco, domestic violence, and artificial heart valves. 267 To date, no
litigation group has been organized that specializes in any category of
268Internet injury. As Part II showed, cybertort litigation has been
stillborn because the overly inclusive federal immunity makes it highly
implausible that a judgment may be obtained against a solvent
defendant.
In this Part, we argue that Congress should amend § 230 to reimpose a
regime modeled on the common law's "distributor with knowledge"
principle. 269 Absolute immunity made sense in the formative era of the
Internet when potential liability might have swamped America Online
and other nascent ISPs. As the Internet has matured, a worldwide trend
towards imposing greater liability on ISPs is gaining momentum.27 °
(abolishing sovereign immunity of state as well as subordinate governmental units); Ayala v.
Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 305 A.2d 877, 878 (Pa. 1973) (abolishing governmental immunity
against local governmental units).
267. Association of Trial Lawyers of America, ATLA Litigation Group Policies and Procedures
[hereinafter ATLA], at http://atla.org/members/litintro.aspx#1 (last visited Mar. 12, 2005).
268. It is surprising that trial lawyers have not filed suit against service providers who negligently
enable the loss of third-party data, fail to prevent computer intrusions, or spread computer viruses by
not having up-to-date anti-virus programs.
Several factors make ISPs attractive defendants in defamation claims, many of which relate to
the costs associated with litigation. For example, the author of a defamatory statement will
often reside outside the jurisdiction of the plaintiff, whereas the ISP that carried the statement
does business in the plaintiff's jurisdiction. It might be difficult, time-consuming, or even
impossible, to determine the actual author of the message. And even if the author can be
identified, he or she may be judgement proof, whereas the ISP likely has "deeper pockets."
Michael Deturbide, Liability of Internet Service Providers for Defamation in the US and Britain:
Same Competing Interests, Different Responses, J. INFO. L. & TECH., pt. 1 (Issue Three) (2000)
(citations omitted), available at http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/00-3/deturbide.html.
269. Most legal commentators agree that § 230 immunizes intermediaries for publisher's liability
but not for distributor liability. Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace:
The Case ofIntermediary Liability for Defamation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 569, 637-42 (2001)
(arguing that courts have misinterpreted § 230 and should leave distributor liability intact); David R.
Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act upon
Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 61 ALB. L. REv. 147, 167-72 (1997) (stating that when
"Congress said 'publisher,' it meant 'publisher,' and not 'distributor').
270. Martin J. Hayes, Internet Service Provider Liability: Overview of Internet Service Providers
Liability, at http://www.jisclegal.ac.uk/ispliability/ispliability.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2005).
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Under the distributor with knowledge rule, ISPs would have an incentive
to widen new technologies for detecting and constraining wrongdoers.
Our reform proposal continues to give ISPs immunity for mere
271
conduit, caching, and hosting activities, unless they have actual notice.
We favor a synchronized "notice, takedown, and put-back" regime for
all civil and criminal wrongdoing. The ISP with actual notice will be
liable for information torts as well as the infringement of intellectual
property rights when it does not take prompt corrective measures.
Finally, the ISP must act "expeditiously" to remove or disable access to
the allegedly infringing material or the subject of the infringing
activity.
This Article proposes a rule based on actual knowledge because a
constructive notice rule creates the danger that ISPs will be
overwhelmed with frivolous takedown requests. The constructive
knowledge rule assumes that a reasonable ISP should have known about
objectionable content and in effect, dictates the monitoring of all content
on its services. This inflexible standard would have a chilling effect on
free expression by causing some ISPs to shut down their services and by
increasing the cost of Internet communications. It would be simply too
burdensome to require online intermediaries to scrutinize all of the
listservs, websites, or electronic bulletin boards
273 that they host.274
Imposing too much liability on ISPs will:
271. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000) (conditioning conduit liability on ISP not modifying or assuming
role of content creator and noting that ISP must appoint agent to receive complaints of alleged
infringement).
272. See id.
273. A bulletin board, in the Internet context, is "a computer-based system giving users access
from remote terminals to text and programs contributed by one another and stored centrally." Batzel
v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 n.9 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 642 (2d
ed. 1989)).
274. The Fourth Circuit, in Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997),
explained the congressional purpose behind § 230 of the CDA:
Congress made a policy choice ... not to deter harmful online speech through the separate
route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties'
potentially injurious messages. Congress' purpose in providing the § 230 immunity was thus
evident. Interactive computer services have millions of users. The amount of information
communicated via interactive computer services is therefore staggering. The specter of tort
liability in an area of such prolific speech would have an obvious chilling effect. It would be
impossible for service providers to screen each of their millions of postings for possible
problems. Faced with potential liability for each message republished by their services,
interactive computer service providers might choose to severely restrict the number and type of
messages posted. Congress considered the weight of the speech interests implicated and chose
to immunize service providers to avoid any such restrictive effect.
Id. at 330-31 (citations omitted).
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encourage the virtually automatic and unthinking removal by
intermediaries of material from the public domain. A legal
system that not only permits but also encourages on-line
intermediaries to indiscriminately eliminate any material from
the Internet upon receipt of virtually any notice from third
parties will threaten freedom of expression and fair
275competition.
The imposition of a notice and takedown regime founded upon actual
knowledge rather than on mere constructive knowledge strikes a suitable
balance between the First Amendment and cybertort liability.
Reforming online intermediary law is a way to jumpstart tort law so
that it will evolve to redress online injuries.276 One of the reasons that
cybertorts have not yet developed in the fields of negligence and strict
liability is the perception of trial lawyers that ISPs are not worth
277pursuing because they function in a "liability-free" zone. If ISPs are
held liable for failing to take reasonable actions to take down offensive
content, trial lawyers will begin to think more creatively to develop other
theories of cyberspace liability. Tort law historically has witnessed the
elimination of overly broad immunities, 278 allowing Americans to protect
279our institutions, our bodily integrity, and our right to enjoy property.
A. The Least Cost Avoider in Cyberspace
The ISP is typically in the position of the "least cost avoider" to
prevent further harm to Internet users.280 Professors Ronald Mann and
275. ESPRIT PROJECT 27028: Electronic Commerce Legal Issues Platform, Recommendations to
the Commission: Liability for Online Intermediaries, at 4 (Feb. 9, 2000) [hereinafter ESPRIT
Project 27028], available at http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/legal/en/lab/991216/recomm-liability.pdf.
276. See Anthony J. Sebok, The Invisible Borderlines of Tort on the Internet, in SELECTED LEGAL
ISSUES OF E-COMMERCE 57, 77 (Toshiyuki Kono et al. eds., 2002).
277. To date, the leading trial lawyers' organization has yet to establish any significant litigation
groups in Internet-related torts, so presumably the costs must exceed the potential payouts.
Litigation groups form to share information to reduce the cost of discovery and to increase
efficiencies in the conduct of litigation. ATLA, supra note 267.
278. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The American Civil
Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 38-39 (2002) (surveying
erosion of immunities in tort law).
279. See generally id. (tracing historical expansion and contraction of American tort rights and
remedies).
280. Guido Calabresi developed the concept of the "least cost avoider." See generally GUIDO
CALABrREsI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL & ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970). "In tort law, this
consideration answers questions such as who, between two parties, ought to bear liability if there is
an accident; and how should that liability be apportioned, if at all?" Robert P. Merges, As Many as
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Jane Winn note that, "in many contexts... an ISP is in a position to
hinder wrongful conduct by those whose transmissions pass through its
network." 281 They cite the example of the ISP's capability of
implementing filters against unsolicited bulk e-mail at a reasonable
cost. 282 Broadly speaking, the most economical cost-avoider criterion
"corresponds to notions of common-sense causation and
responsibility.
283
The ISP is in a superior position to install software that "yields the
greatest net saving (or smallest net loss) in total costs (accident costs
plus accident avoidance costs)." 284 Online intermediaries such as AOL
are recurrently the only entities that have the available technologies to
unveil abusive posters, promptly take down offensive websites, or
rescind the accounts of cyber-recidivists. ISPs are in the position of first
responder when a consumer is defrauded or suffers other losses as the
result of a website swindle. These entities are generally the first to
identify unauthorized changes to computer systems that point toward a
computer intrusion. For these reasons, online intermediaries should be
subject to tort liability where they have actual knowledge of torts or
crimes being committed on their services.
The ISP is generally in the best position to develop comprehensive
authentication systems to reduce anonymous crimes and torts in
cyberspace. In our example of the fraudulent sale of Porsches, 285 Yahoo!
is the foremost line of defense against cybertort injuries because it is in
the position to receive and evaluate system-wide complaints about
sellers who use its services. Yahoo! is the least cost avoider because it
maintains audit trails that are likely to expose the architect of an online
fraud. However, absent a change in ISP law, Yahoo! has no
responsibility to lend a hand to consumers who are victimized by online
frauds even if the ISP can readily uncover the wrongdoer's contact
information.286
Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System
Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 600 (1999).
281. MANN & WINN, supra note 9, at 189.
282. See id.
283. Stephen G. Gilles, Negligence, Strict Liability, and the Cheapest Cost-Avoider, 78 VA. L.
REV. 1291, 1374 (1992).
284. Id. at 1316.
285. See infra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
286. Even though the Authors and the seller had an extensive e-mail exchange, we had no way of
identifying who the fraudulent seller was or in what country he was located. Yahoo! has no
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B. Adapting European Takedown Regimes
Our proposed "notice and take-down" reform will bring U.S. tort law
into alignment with the European Union community's 287 E-Commerce
Directive.2 88 The Directive's "notice, take-down and put-back" regime289
strikes the correct balance between liability and immunity by making the
least cost avoider accountable. 290 The E-Commerce Directive requires
member states to acknowledge electronic contracts, 291 establishes the
liability of Internet intermediaries, 292 provides for online dispute
resolution, 293 and harmonizes e-commerce rules. 294 The European
Union's Directive "seeks to contribute to the proper functioning of the
internal market by ensuring the free movement of information society
services between the Member States. '295 This legal regime institutes ISP
liability rules not only for torts but also for all types of illegitimate
activities in cyberspace. The Directive treats all liability horizontally so
that it applies "to all kinds of illegal material provided by third parties,
including copyright, trademark, defamatory statements, pornography,
procedures for assisting consumers in locating wrongdoers and, under current law, has no obligation
to assist the defrauded Internet user.
287. See Europa, E-Commerce: EU Law Boosting Emerging Sector, at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/03/1580&format=HTML&aged=l&
language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited Mar. 13, 2005).
288. See generally E-Commerce Directive, supra note 27.
289. Rosa JuliA-Barcel6 & Kamiel J. Koelman, Intermediary Liability in the E-Commerce
Directive: So Far So Good, But It's Not Enough (2000) (using this phrase to describe E-Commerce
Directive's ISP liability rules), available at http://www.ivir.nl/publications/koelman/notenough.html
(last visited Mar. 16, 2005). "It must also be kept in mind that the Directive only provides for a
system of liability exemptions for ISPs. Thus, if an ISP does not qualify for an exemption under the
Directive, its liability will be determined by the national laws of the respective Member States."
Baistrocchi, supra note 22, at 119.
290. A United Kingdom governmental department noted:
There is a careful balance to be maintained between, on the one hand, protecting the interests of
originators and users of Internet content and, on the other hand, encouraging new
intermediaries (especially ISPs) to enter the market (and existing ones to continue). In striking
this balance, the Directive seeks to stimulate cooperation between different parties and so
reduce the risk of illegal activity online while ensuring that liability can be correctly
apportioned.
Department of Trade & Industry, Industries and Sectors eCommunications: Policy Background, at
http://www.dti.gov.uk/industries/content/chapter_6.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2005).
291. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 27, at art. 9, at 11-12.
292. Id. at art. 12-15, at 12-13.
293. Id. at art. 17, at 14.
294. See generally id.
295. Id. at art. 1, at 8.
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etc. Second, as regards the types of liability covered by the Directive, it
should be noted that the liability limitations apply not only to civil but
also to criminal liability.',
296
Articles 10 through 21 of the E-Commerce Directive "set forth the
liability limitations for intermediary service providers and applicable
take-down and put-back regimes for illegal material distributed through
their facilities." 297 European ISPs are immunized for caching, 298
hosting,299 and perfunctory tasks related to efficient transmission of
digital data. The E-Commerce Directive does not impose liability on the
ISP if it does not modify information transmitted by third parties, unless
the ISP acquires actual or constructive notice of illegal content and fails
to take prompt remedial steps . 300 Article 15(1) makes it clear that
Member States may not impose a duty on providers to investigate
questionable e-mails or website posters. 301 Article 15(2), however,
permits Member States to enact legislation requiring providers to notify
law enforcement when they discover illegal activities on their
services . 302 One of the complexities of the E-Commerce Directive's
constructive notice provision is its insufficient guidance as to what
circumstances and requirements place ISPs on notice.30 3
The E-Commerce Directive provides the floorboards but not the
296. JuliA-Barcel6 & Koelman, supra note 289.
297. MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, THE EMERGING EUROPEAN REGIME ON ISP LIABILITY:
MEMBER STATES MAKE PROGRESS IMPLEMENTING E-COMMERCE DIRECTIVE (2002), available at
http://www.softic.or.jp/symposium/open-materials/l1th/en/vinje2-en.pdf.
298. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 27, at art. 13, at 13.
299. Id. at art. 14, at 13.
300. "The directive covers all forms of IP, including copyright, patent and trademark, but would
permit member states to go beyond it by enacting greater protections for rights holders in business
tort cases and licensing disputes." U.S., European Groups Coalesce to Combat Controversial
Proposal, 4 WARREN'S WASH. INTERNET DAILY 1 (Aug. 8, 2003) [hereinafter Controversial
Proposal]. The E-Commerce Directive does not really spell out ISP liability, nor does it provide a
methodology for determining damages for contributory infringement. In general, the Directive has
been criticized for its vague standards for implementing its takedown regime. JuliA-Barcel6 &
Koelman, supra note 289.
301. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 27, at art. 15(1), at 13.
302. Article 15(2) states:
Member States may establish obligations for information society service providers promptly to
inform the competent public authorities of alleged illegal activities undertaken or information
provided by recipients of their service or obligations to communicate to the competent
authorities, at their request, information enabling the identification of recipients of their service
with whom they have storage agreements.
Id. at art. 15(2), at 13.
303. See JuliA-Barcel6 & Koelman, supra note 289.
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304
ceiling tiles of protection accorded to European citizens. Member
States have the discretion to implement even more rigorous obligations
for online intermediaries than the Directive dictates. 0 France, for
example, requires ISPs to offer sufficient screening to permit parents to
control their children's access to objectionable materials. 306 Each
European Member State has the discretion to develop its own procedures
to sanction those who violate the Directive.
307
The benefits of imposing this limited liability come at a price. The
current absolute immunity enjoyed by American ISPs has the virtue of
drawing a clear line that eliminates any exposure to liability for third-
party content. The imposition of even a limited duty for ISPs creates
legal uncertainties and new financial burdens. ISPs, for example, need to
bear the expenditures of investigating complaints, tracking down
wrongdoers, and making nuanced takedown and put-back decisions
under European law. These higher costs are passed on to computer users
and other consumers in Internet access charges.
The European Union's E-Commerce Directive has also been criticized
for promoting self-censorship, the loss of privacy, and a decline in the
free flow of information.3 °8 A Dutch civil rights group did an experiment
in which they posted an 1871 document by a well-known Dutch author,
which was clearly not protected by copyright, to accounts with ten
different ISPs. They next e-mailed bogus takedown notices to each ISP,
claiming that they were the valid copyright holder of the document and
demanding that it be taken down. Seven of the ten ISPs removed the
"objectionable" material, sometimes within hours and without informing
304. One of the major problems with the Directive, unlike the DMCA, is that it is standards-based
rather than rule-based. The Directive sets a baseline of protection but leaves it up to the Member
States to provide specific protection for "notice and take-down procedures." Another possibility is
that the Directive contemplates that industry standards will emerge to supplement, but not supplant
the Council's basic principles. See JuliA-Barcel6 & Koelman, supra note 289.
305. Telephone Interview with Sandra Paulsson, Trainee, Policy Department for Economics and
Science, DG2, European Parliament (Nov. 8, 2004).
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Two commentators describe how the E-Commerce Directive's takedown procedure clashes
with free expression, which is a fundamental human right in Europe:
[S]erious questions arise as to the constitutionality of such laws that permit (indeed encourage)
the elimination of information from the public domain without proper consideration of the
consequences for freedom of expression. Apart from their validity under Member State
constitutions, one can doubt the consistency of Internet liability regimes such as those evolving
in Europe with Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
JuliA-Barcel6 & Koelman, supra note 289.
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the account holder.30 9 The First Amendment concerns raised by this legal
reform can be best countered by arming content creators with a legal
remedy that could be used to punish and deter inappropriate takedown
requests, as this Article proposes in Part IV.D.9.31 °
C. Digital Millennium Copyright Act's Takedown Regime
Our wished-for ISP regime also would be harmonized with the
takedown policy of the DMCA. 311 The DMCA amended the U.S.
Copyright Act to adapt to Internet-related technologies.312 Section 512 of
the Act creates a "safe harbor" for ISPs that are providing only
309. Jason Schultz, Copyright Takedown Experiment Reveals Horrible ISP Policies, at
http://joi.ito.com/archives/2004/10/20/copyright-takedownexperiment-reveals.horrible-isp-polici
es.html (Oct. 20, 2004).
310. One commentator stated: "With the European Union's e-commerce directive up for review
next year ... free speech activists will likely press for a 'put-back' provision in any revision of that
law or the copyright directive. 'Private censorship sounds a bit hysterical,' [Marsden] said, but that's
what the lack of a put-back provision means." COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Aug. 30, 2004, LEXIS,
Nexis Current News Library, Communications Daily File (quoting Christopher Marsden, research
officer with Oxford University's Programme in Comparative Media Law & Policy). This Article
argues that protections against torts, crimes, and infringement need to be appropriately balanced
with the First Amendment. A legal regime which requires notice-based takedown as well as putback
will provide protection without unduly chilling free speech.
ISPs who claimed they couldn't possibly monitor everything said on hosted websites lobbied
Congress for protection and, in 1998, President Clinton signed into effect the DMCA. Under
Title II of the DMCA, an ISP can avoid financial liability by following the "notice and
takedown" provisions, should one of its subscribers offer infringing copy online. These
provisions basically state that once an ISP receives notice of the infringement, it must take
down the unauthorized material.
Nolo, When Is an ISP Liable for the Acts of Its Subscribers (citations omitted), at
http://www.nolo.com/article.cfm/!ObjectID/1902780E-68C9-436B-
925AC37E42F4CD71/catlD/806B7BA0-4CDF-4221-9230A3135E2DF07A!104/284/205/ART (last
visited Mar. 13, 2005); see 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).
311. Pub. L. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.).
312. As one court noted:
"The DMCA was enacted both to preserve copyright enforcement on the Intemet and to
provide immunity to service providers from copyright infringement liability" for "passive,"
"automatic" actions in which a service provider's system engages through a technological
process initiated by another without the knowledge of the service provider. This immunity,
however, is not presumptive, but granted only to "innocent" service providers who can prove
they do not have actual or constructive knowledge of the infringement, as defined under any of
the three prongs of 17 [U.S.C.] § 512(c)(1).
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1086 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (citations omitted);
see Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. 105-304, § 202, 112 Stat. 2860, 2877-2886 (1998)
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 512).
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313intermediate and temporary storage of digital copies. ISPs are
immunized from copyright infringement claims for four activities: (1)
transitory communications; 314 (2) caching; 315 (3) content of websites
hosted by the ISP; 316 and (4) information location tools. 317 Section 512(a)
of the DMCA limits the liability of a service provider where the ISP
merely transmits digital information that may include infringing
material. In order to meet the requirements of § 512(a)'s safe harbor, the
ISP must meet stringent criteria.318 Section 512(c) of the DMCA
immunizes service providers from copyright infringement claims so long
as they do not have actual knowledge of the infringing activity and
promptly block allegedly infringing sales once notified.319 To qualify for
such protection, an ISP must meet three requirements: (i) the service
provider must either lack both actual knowledge of the infringing
activity and awareness of facts or circumstances from which infringing
activity should be apparent, or it must promptly, upon gaining such
knowledge move to prevent the use of its service to further such
infringing activity; (ii) the service provider must not receive a financial
benefit directly attributable to infringing activity it has the ability to
control; and (iii) the service provider must expeditiously remove
material from its service on receipt of an appropriate written notice in
order to qualify for safe harbor protection under the DMCA.32 °
The DMCA also tackles the ISPs' responsibility for the content of
their websites, bulletin board systems, and other sources of
313. The DMCA created a "safe harbor" for Internet service providers who satisfy the
requirements of the statute, which protects them against suits for damages and most injunctive relief.
17 U.S.C. § 512. There are four separate safe harbors within § 512, each with its own separate
requirements. See id. § 512(a), (b), (c)(l), (d). However, a threshold requirement for any protection
by the DMCA is satisfaction of the requirements in 17 U.S.C. § 512(i). Section 512 defines "service
provider" as, inter alia, a "provider of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities
therefore." Id. § 512(k).
314. Id. § 512(b).
315. Id. § 512(c)(1).
316. Id. §512(a).
317. Id. § 512(d).
318. Id. § 512(a) (noting that ISP is immunized when transmissions are initiated by third parties,
copying is done automatically, ISP does not select recipients, copies are not accessible to anyone
other than anticipated recipients, and material is transmitted without modification of content).
319. Id. § 512(c)(1).
320. Id.; Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that
web site and its employees were protected under safe harbor provision of DMCA against copyright
claims and Lanham Act claim was moot because eBay had already removed allegedly false and
misleading advertisements); Chilling Effects Clearinghouse, DMCA Safe Harbor Provisions, at
http://www.chillingeffects.org/dmca512 (last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
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information.32 ' Service providers are not liable for content stored on their
systems when they do not have actual or constructive knowledge of the
infringing activity. 322 The plaintiff in a copyright infringement action
must also demonstrate that the ISP received a financial benefit directly
attributable to the infringing activity. 323 The next Part compares the
similarities and dissimilarities of our proposed ISP rule with two extant
ISP liability regimes already in place, the DMCA and the E-Commerce
Directive.
CHART FOUR: COMPARING ISP LIABILITY REGIMES
Rustad & E-Commerce
Koenig's DMCA's Directive's




Applicable Applies to all Applies only to Applies to all
Law types of illegal vicarious or types of
content: torts, contributory illegal
crimes, and copyright content: torts,
infringement, infringement.' crimes, and
infringement."_
Duty to None None... Noneiv
Monitor
Content
Jurisdiction U.S. Federal U.S. Federal Procedure yet
Courts' Courts" to be
determined."'
321. The notice-and-takedown procedure of the DMCA provides ISPs with guidance and a basis
for balancing the interests of the complainant and the content provider. A European electronic
commerce think tank made a similar point:
In particular, under the notice and take-down procedure, the law would provide some
guidelines as to the form and contents of a notice for an on-line intermediary to act thereon,
thus removing the material. Requiring a detailed notice accompanied with sufficient
documentation of the claim from the person who says that his rights have been infringed,
would help reduce unfounded notices or notices sent [to accomplish] improper objectives[,]
such as shut[ting] down debate or prevent[ing] fair competition.
ESPRIT PROJECT 27028, supra note 275, at 4.
322. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii).
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D. Comparing Takedown Regimes
Chart Four compares and contrasts our online intermediary proposal
with the takedown provisions of the DMCA and the E-Commerce
Directive. Under our legal reform, ISPs would be liable only for failing
to act swiftly in blocking or removing content known to be a venue for
an ongoing tort. Content creators would have a right to a hearing in any




put-back orders.324 This tort reform will harmonize § 230 with the
takedown regime already in place for U.S. copyright infringement
claims.325
Takedown is already the de facto enforcement tool of choice used by
ISPs to police the Internet. 326 Corporate Internet actors already
recurrently remove objectionable content as a means of self-help.
Microsoft, for example, recently took down a Windows news site for
nearly twenty-four hours after a provider accused the site of infringing
its copyrights.327 Powerful entertainment industry stakeholders have on
occasion taken down material even when they had no legal right to do
so. The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) has initiated
a number of erroneous DMCA demands against individuals as well as
websites.328 For example, "[s]even record labels mistakenly sued a 65-
year-old Massachusetts woman for copyright infringement." 329
Online intermediaries complain about inappropriate demands. "In
2002, Pacific Bell Internet Services and its affiliates were given more
than 16,700 DMCA notices by RIAA agent MediaForce; in July 2003,
RIAA attempted to serve more than 200 subpoenas through various
affiliated entities." 330 An online pornography website sent a DMCA
demand to an ISP "demanding identities of alleged infringers at 59
different dynamically assigned IP addresses, then dropped the subpoena
when Pacific Bell announced its intent to challenge its enforcement. 33'
A recent study of the DMCA concludes that takedown orders have been
324. This procedure is necessary in tort cases where the ISP cannot clearly ascertain whether an
information tort has been committed. Most cybertort injuries are based on fraud or other intentional
torts, which would not require a hearing.
325. No compelling reason exists to have absolute immunity from tort liability but limited
liability from copyright infringement. The "notice, takedown, and put-back" proposal for torts is
carefully balanced to prevent ISPs from being overrun by frivolous requests. In our proposal, the
ISP has no duty to monitor content and must act only after receiving actual notice by a registered
complainant. Frivolous takedown or put-back requests may subject the complainant to a lawsuit for
punitive damages in egregious circumstances.
326. Joe Wilcox, Microsoft Speaks, Site Goes Dark, CNETNews.com, Mar. 10, 2003, available
at http://news.com.com/2100-1025-991624.html?tag=fdlede Ihed.
327. Id.
328. See Declan McCullagh, RIAA Apologizes for Erroneous Letters, CNETNews.com, at
http://news.com.com/RIAA+apologizes+for+erroneous+letters/2100-10253-1001319.html (May
13, 2003).
329. Electronic Freedom Foundation, Unsafe Harbors: Abusive DMCA Subpoenas and Takedown







The DMCA has been used to invade the privacy of Internet
users, harass Internet service providers, and chill online speech.
The subpoena and takedown powers of Section 512 are not
limited to cases of proven copyright infringement, and are
exercised without a judge's review .... Judicial oversight could
curb these abuses without interfering with copyright
enforcement.332
Given this pattern of known abuse, it is imperative to have safeguards
against bad faith, frivolous, or erroneous takedown requests. Our
proposal addresses the problem of flawed takedown requests by
providing judicial oversight and remedies with teeth. This new ISP rule
gives content creators the right to a federal court hearing to promptly
reverse unsound takedown orders. Persons or entities will be liable for
financial penalties, including punitive damages, when they make a
strategic takedown demand that is calculated to injure competitors or is
otherwise in bad faith.333 The DMCA provides an excellent blueprint for
our proposal because it makes complainants accountable for any actual
or consequential damages to the content creator for making a material
misrepresentation to a provider.334
1. The Applicable Law
This Article proposes to utilize the same rule for intellectual property
infringement as the rule currently followed by the DMCA.335 It applies
the "distributors with knowledge" rule to all civil liabilities of online
intermediaries, not just those liabilities imposed by tort law. The
proposed regime will restore balance in the law of online intermediaries
by imposing limited liability on ISPs for failing to take down infringing
or tortuous content. Content creators who are victimized by bad faith
takedown demands will have recourse in the form of actual damages and
punitive damages, a remedy not available under either the DMCA or the
E-Commerce Directive.
332. Id.
333. See MORRISON & FOERSTER, supra note 297, at 4 (stating E-Commerce Directive contains
similar provision).
334. Id.
335. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).
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2. No Duty to Monitor Content
This Article's projected ISP rule does not impose a duty on service
providers to monitor content, which is consistent with the provisions of
the CDA, DMCA, and the E-Commerce Directive. The E-Commerce
Directive makes it clear that the provider has no affirmative duty to
monitor content.336 However, article 15(2) of the Directive allows the
Member States to enact legislation to require the provider to notify law
enforcement when it determines that there are illegal activities on its
33service.  The DMCA also does not require ISPs to monitor content, but
they must remove content upon discovery of the infringement.338
Under this Article's proposal, an online intermediary that learns of
ongoing infringing, tortious, or criminal material must take prompt
action as soon as it learns of objectionable material.339 Our proposal is
harmonized with the DMCA rule that providers must take prompt
remedial measures when they receive actual notice of infringing
material, even if this occurs prior to a formal takedown notice. 340 Our
reform adopts the general notice and procedural protections of the
DMCA and simply extends the duty of ISPs from removing infringing
materials to removing or disabling tortious content upon discovery.34 1
The ISP, in other words, is divested of its federal immunity at the point
that it obtains actual notice or acquires actual knowledge of infringement
and fails to expeditiously remove or disable objectionable content.342
336. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 27, at art. 15(1), at 13 (member states shall not impose a
general obligation on members).
337. Article 15(2) states that:
Member States may establish obligations for information society service providers promptly to
inform the competent public authorities of alleged illegal activities undertaken or information
provided by recipients of their service or obligations to communicate to the competent
authorities, at their request, information enabling the identification of recipients of their service
with whom they have storage agreements.
E-Commerce Directive, supra note 27, at art. 15(2), at 13.
338. 17 U.S.C. § 512.
339. Neither the DMCA nor the E-Commerce Directive addresses immunity for criminal activity.
Immunity is not available for violations of federal criminal statutes under the CDA. 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(e)(1) (2000).
340. The DMCA's protection of an innocent service provider under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)
"disappears at the moment the service provider becomes aware that a third party is using its system
to infringe." Upon receiving notice, the DCMA shifts responsibility to the service provider to
disable the infringing matter, preserving the strong incentives for prompt remedial action. See
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1086 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
341. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii); id. § 512(d)(1)(C).
342. In most instances, the ISP will acquire actual notice of infringement or an ongoing tort by
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3. Federal Court Oversight of Takedown & Put-Back
Federal court oversight is necessary to put a stop to unwarranted
takedown demands based on general, vague, or inaccurate allegations.
We believe that our proposal to extend the DMCA framework to
information torts and other illegal activities will not inundate the courts
with new cases343 nor pose difficult transition problems for the federal
courts. 344 Since 1998, the federal district courts have decided only a
handful of cases construing the DMCA's takedown procedures, even
though the DMCA provides content providers with the right to a federal
court hearing.345
As shown in Part I, most cyberlaw cases are already decided in
federal courts, as are all copyright infringement disputes under the
DMCA. In many instances, takedown demands will arise out of disputes
over federal statutory rights for intellectual property rights. Ensuring the
right to a federal district court hearing appropriately balances the rights
of content creators, consumers, and other Internet stakeholders. Under
our proposal, federal district courts will have jurisdiction over claims
that ISPs failed to satisfy the conditions for a safe harbor.346 The federal
courts' experience in deciding DMCA liability cases will prove
invaluable for establishing the parameters for takedown procedures, put-
back appeals, and other embryonic problems.
One of the advantages of adopting the DMCA's methodology for
receipt of a complaint. Our proposal tracks the DMCA's procedure, which requires the complainant
to provide sufficient information to identify infringing material and contact the infringing party. See
id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iv).
343. A federal district judge commented that our proposed takedown and put-back proposal
calling for federal court hearings might swamp the court's already burdensome docket.
Memorandum from Judge Edward F. Harrington to Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig (Oct.
29, 2004) (commenting on draft of Article) (on file with Authors). Federal courts already handle
DMCA "takedown" and "put-back" procedures, and their increasing expertise in this field makes
them the best possible tribunals. We do not envision a floodgate of distributor-with-knowledge
lawsuits because most takedown requests will be obvious tortious or criminal activities not requiring
a judicial opinion. The federal court would only hear a case in which the content provider challenges
the decision to take down content.
344. One potential problem of our unified procedure is that, on its face, it appears to federalize
tort law for cyberspace. The federal courts may wish to remand selected issues of tort law to the
state's highest court just as they often do in diversity cases.
345. A LEXIS/NEXIS search, conducted on Jan. 12, 2005, of all federal and state cases,
uncovered five decisions discussing DMCA takedown procedures.
346. See, e.g., Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming summary
judgment on vicarious liability; remanding for trial on contributory infringement issue based on
DMCA safe harbor provisions).
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takedowns and put-backs is that there is a well-established procedure for
resolving disputes between content providers, websites, and service
providers, as illustrated in the recent case of Rossi v. Motion Picture
Ass 'n of America, Inc. 3 4 7 In Rossi, a website owner appealed a decision
of the federal district court granting summary judgment to the motion
picture trade association in a tort action.348 The plaintiff owned and
operated the "intemetmovies.com" website. 349 The plaintiffs website
encouraged subscribers to: "Join to download full length movies online
now! new movies every month., 350 The Motion Picture Association of
America (MPAA) has a mission that includes preventing unauthorized
copying, transmittal, or other distribution of the movie studios' motion
pictures. 351 After viewing the website, the MPAA believed that illicit
copying of movies was taking place, and it sent a DMCA takedown
demand to both the website and its service provider.352
The ISP then sent a DMCA notice to the website, stating that the
website would be shut down.353 The plaintiff responded by finding "a
new ISP to host intemetmovies.com." 354 The plaintiff then sued the
MPAA in federal court on a variety of tort claims, including tortious
interference.355 The federal court ruled that the MPAA had complied
with the DMCA's notice-and-takedown procedure and entered summary
judgment against the plaintiff on all counts.35 6 The federal appeals court
affirmed the lower court's ruling that the MPAA acted in good faith.357
4. Immunity for Transmitting Content
Our ISP reform confers immunity on all online intermediaries for
purely conduit activities, whether the content is challenged on proof that
it is infringing, tortious, or criminal. Copyright owners must abide by the
347. 391 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004).
348. Id. at 1002 (describing complaint for tortious interference of contract, defamation, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress in association's takedown request under DMCA).
349. Id. at 1001-02.











DMCA notice requirements to compel ISPs to remove or disable
infringing content. 358 Article 12 of the E-Commerce Directive exempts
ISPs for mere conduit activity. 359 ISPs must act reasonably in taking
down infringing content once they receive notice. Our unified ISP
proposal tracks the DMCA in imposing a registration requirement on
intermediaries claiming immunity for these activities.
360
5. Conditions for ISP Safe Harbor
ISPs should not be shielded from liability unless they fulfill all of the
procedural steps necessary to qualify for a safe harbor. Our service
provider reform proposal incorporates the DMCA's registration and
notice requirements. ISPs are not entitled to a "safe harbor" unless they
register contact information with the U.S. Copyright Office. In addition,
the online intermediary must: (1) have no actual knowledge of, or
financial benefit361 from, the infringing, tortious, or illegal activity; (2)
have no role in modifying or creating the objectionable content; (3) post
a conspicuous notice on its website informing users of the procedure for
making takedown requests; (4) appoint an agent to deal with takedown
and put-back requests; (5) provide a verifiable telephone number,
mailing address, and e-mail address for complaints about illegal or
objectionable content; and (6) register its website and agent contact with
an appropriate government entity.362 These well-honed procedures will
be extended from copyright infringement cases to all forms of
objectionable conduct, including cybertorts.
358. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A) (2000) (stating that to be effective, notification must be written
communication to designated agent of service provider, containing physical or electronic signature
of person authorized to act for copyright owner; identification of material claimed to be infringing,
information sufficient to permit service provider to contact complaining party; statement that
complaining party has good faith belief that material is not authorized by copyright owner; and
statement made under penalty of perjury that notification is accurate).
359. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 27, at art. 12, at 12-13 (immunizing ISPs from damages
liability for content transmitted by third parties so long as ISP does not initiate transmission, select
recipient, or select or modify information); see also id. at art. 13, at 13 (immunizing liability for
caching activity); id. at art. 14, at 13 (immunizing liability for hosting activity).
360. As with the DMCA, our proposal confers immunity on search engines such as Google,
Yahoo!, and Excite for references or links to infringing materials. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(d).
361. Financial benefit in this context means that the ISP profits directly from the distribution,
transmission, or storage of the actual content, as opposed to being a passive conduit where it enjoys
immunity.




The foundation of our reform proposal is to institute a limited liability
for ISPs that strips them of distributor immunity once they have actual
notice of ongoing torts, crimes, or other illegal activities on their services
and fail to expeditiously remove objectionable content. Our ISP regime
is harmonized with the Directive that has been in place throughout
Europe since 1998. Our proposal adopts the conduit liability rules
already in place under the E-Commerce Directive as well as the DMCA.
Article 12 of the Directive immunizes ISPs when they are acting as
"mere conduits," which means that they do not "initiate the
information,'363 "select the receiver of the transmission, or "select or
modify the information contained in the transmission. 365
The Directive's ISP immunity extends to all housekeeping and
administrative tasks in the transmission of information including
caching,366 hosting,367 and other acts of transmission, so long as they are
not deemed content creators.368 ISPs are liable for not expeditiously
removing content that constitutes infringement or for torts or crimes after
they acquire notice of objectionable content, 369 but they have no
obligation to monitor content.37° Our unified ISP reform mirrors the E-
Commerce Directive because it applies to all takedown requests, whether
classified as copyright infringement or other illegal content. Our law
reform also adopts the E-Commerce Directive's rule that ISPs have no
general obligation to monitor objectionable content.
363. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 27, at art. 12(l)(a), at 12.
364. Id. at art. 12(l)(b), at 12.
365. Id. at art. 12(l)(c), at 12.
366. Id. at art. 13, at 13.
367. Id. at art. 14, at 13.
368. Article 12 states:
The acts of transmission and of provision of access referred to... include the automatic,
intermediate and transient storage of the information transmitted in so far as this takes place for
the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission in the communication network, and provided
that the information is not stored for any period longer than is reasonably necessary for the
transmission.
Id. at art. 12(2), at 12.
369. "The directive covers all forms of IP, including copyright, patent and trademark, but would
permit member states to go beyond it by enacting greater protections for rights holders in business
tort cases and licensing disputes." Controversial Proposal, supra note 300, at 153.
370. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 27, at art. 15, at 13 (noting that ISPs have no general
obligation to monitor services provided by ISP, such as e-mail communications).
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7. Our Proposed Rule for ISP Notice
The Directive is a sweeping set of general legal principles rather than
the detailed guidance needed to implement a workable ISP takedown
policy. The Directive provides little by way of practical advice to ISPs
on how to administratively handle takedown and put-back. The
Directive, for example, does not address the issue of whether a content
creator is entitled to notice prior to its content being removed. The
Directive does not require Member States to adopt enabling legislation
requiring ISPs to contact law enforcement when they become aware of
illegal activities on their services. 371 Similarly, the E-Commerce
Directive does not provide a specific takedown framework, nor does it
specify the "circumstances and requirements under which 'private
notices' [are] given to host service providers. 372
The E-Commerce Directive's failure to address the relative rights of
content creators to dispute takedown requests is troubling. The Directive
does not even require that third-party content creators be given notice
that their materials are being taken down; it leaves such rules to the
Member States. Our reform gives ISPs the specific guidance that they
need before taking down objectionable content, balancing the protection
of the public with the uniquely American concern for free expression.373
Shackling the First Amendment would be a cyberspace travesty.
However, the First Amendment is not an absolute, even for Internet
speakers.374 There is no First Amendment right to commit tort injuries
371. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 27, at art. 15(2), at 12 (stating that Member States may
establish procedures by which providers inform law enforcement authorities of suspected illegal
activities).
372. JuliA-Barcel6 & Koelman, supra note 289.
373. The vague takedown procedures of the E-Commerce Directive have been criticized as
creating a legal environment where ISPs take down content without sufficient investigation. A
Dutch civil rights group did an experiment in which they posted an 1871 document not protect by
copyright on accounts with ten different ISPs. They next e-mailed takedown notices to each ISP
claiming that they were the valid copyright holder of the document and demanding that it be taken
down. Seven of the ten ISPs removed the "objectionable" material within hours without even
informing the account holder. Schultz, supra note 309.
374. As Professor Lambert reminds us, there are no constitutional absolutes:
The roster of such limitations (to the First Amendment] is not only numerous but formidable.
They include obscenity, perjury, deceit, libel (private as well as political), invasion of privacy,
false advertising, breach of express warranty, disparagement, injurious falsehood, passing off,
espionage, state secrets, contempt of court by epithet and antic and publication, tort of
"Outrage," misappropriation of trade secrets, misleading signals by a driver about to make a
turn, false reassurances that dangers do not exist, violations of anti-dueling statutes by use of
abusive and insulting language, "incitements" to immediate breaches of the peace, et cetera, et
cetera.
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with impunity. Free speech is not a hunting license that immunizes those
who misappropriate personal information, intrude on privacy, distribute
child pornography, incite hackers, and engage in shabby trade practices
such as indiscriminately consuming bandwidth with an ocean of spam e-
mail.
Under our reform proposal, complainants requesting that
objectionable material be blocked or removed must provide certifiable
contact information as well as comply with a prescribed notice to the
ISP. 375 Complaints must document and warrant that the content is
infringing, illegal, or tortious. In addition, the ISP is required to give
notice to the target of the complaint. The ISP is not required to give
notice prior to takedown, but it must convey notice if it makes a decision
to remove or block content.
8. Remedies Against Negligent ISPs
Our proposed ISP rule requires complainants to identify specifically
which website materials constitute ongoing torts or infringe the
intellectual property rights of owners. Once the ISP has actual notice of
illegal activity, it has a duty to expeditiously remove or block access to
the materials. ISPs may acquire this actual notice of illegal activity prior
to a complaint although they have no affirmative duty to monitor their
services. Both the E-Commerce Directive and the DMCA have put-back
procedures to restore content by providing a prescribed notice. The ISP's
failure to comply with the DMCA's registration, notice, and put-back
procedures exposes them to the possibility of monetary damages or
equitable remedies.376 Our proposal extends these procedures beyond
Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., Tort Law, 37 ATLA L.J. 32, 65 (1978).
375. In the unified ISP regime, the complaint is required to make a statement of the accuracy of
the underlying facts in its complaint under penalty of perjury. Secondly, the complainant must attest
that it has the authority to act on behalf of the plaintiff. The requirement that the complainant
register is based largely on the DMCA takedown procedure. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(vi)
(2000) (noting that proposed ISP liability rule requires that complainant provide verifiable address
and contact information); id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i). Whereas the DMCA requires the complaint to
provide sufficient information to identify infringing material, the new ISP rule would require
sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case for ongoing infringement, ongoing torts, or crimes. Cf
id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii). The new ISP rule requires the complainant to attest to the accuracy of the
notice as well as the underlying facts. The DMCA takedown rule requires owners to attest to a good
faith belief in the notice. Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v). In addition, the complaints must attest to the
accuracy of the claim of infringement and that the complainant is an authorized agent for the
copyright owners. Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(vi).
376. See generally Kenneth D. Salomon, Distance Education at the Dawn of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, at http://web.archive.org/web/20041020025702/
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copyright infringement to information torts as well as other illegal
activities.
9. Safeguards Against Bad-Faith Requests
Our suggested ISP reform implements the DMCA's safeguards
against bad-faith or frivolous takedown requests. Congress created a
framework of deterrence against bad-faith takedown requests including
the possibility of damages, costs, and attorneys' fees against bad-faith
claimants. 377 ISPs, on the other hand, enjoy limited liability for
inappropriate takedowns or disabling of posted content, unless their bad
faith is proven or glaring misrepresentations are apparent in the
378takedown notice.
The notice requirement of our proposed ISP rule extends the
procedures of § 512 of the DMCA to all ongoing torts, crimes, and
intellectual property infringement. The targeted content creator has a
fourteen-day window to challenge or request reinstatement of the
material blocked or taken down.379 Unlike the DMCA, complaints that
instigate takedown requests through misrepresentations or in bad faith
are required to indemnify the ISP as well as the blameless target of the
request. The goal of these proposals is to punish and deter those who
demand abusive or bad-faith takedowns.
Both the E-Commerce Directive and the DMCA have similar put-
back procedures to restore content by providing a prescribed notice.38 °
The DMCA calls for those who request the takedown or put-back
procedures to register with the U.S. Copyright Office.381 The DMCA and
the E-Commerce Directive both hold a person liable who makes a
takedown or put-back demand that is in bad faith.382 Under the DMCA, a
http://www.pbs.org/als/agenda/articles/digimilli.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2005).
377. 17 U.S.C. § 512(f).
378. Id. § 512(g)(1).
379. See id. § 512(b)(2).
380. The E-Commerce Directive "contains a put-back regime similar to that in the DMCA, where
the person whose content is alleged to be an infringement may have the allegedly infringing content
put back by providing notice in the form described in the [Directive]." MORRISON & FOERSTER,
supra note 297, at 4; Ecomlex, Implementation of the E-Commerce Directive-Status as of 17
January, 2002 (reporting Finland's implementation of E-commerce Directive), at
http://www.ecomlex.com/documents/FinlandDir.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2005).
381 . 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2) (specifying information that designated agent must post with
Copyright Office to qualify for limitations on secondary copyright liability).
382. MORRISON & FOERSTER, supra note 297, at 4.
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person or entity making a material misrepresentation to a provider is
liable for any actual or consequential damages to the content creator.
383
In summary, our "notice, takedown and put-back" regime would
apply to torts, crime, and infringement for all branches of intellectual
property law. The proposal follows the DMCA's paradigm by requiring
ISPs to expeditiously remove or block illegal or tortious content upon
actual notice by a registered complainant. However, we strongly favor
the right of providers to file damages lawsuits against those parties that
initiate bad faith or frivolous takedown or put-back requests. Content
providers targeted by frivolous takedown requests need remedies with
teeth for use against bad faith complainants.
At present, the E-Commerce Directive does not give content creators
the right to a hearing, which forces ISPs to respond promptly to
complaints about content without input from the other side. Our proposal
provides far greater guidance for ISPs than the Directive. Our ISP reform
proposal provides aggrieved content creators or ISPs victimized by
inappropriate takedown requests with the right to have a federal court
hearing where legal or equitable remedies may be obtained. The E-
Commerce Directive, in contrast, has not provided for any judicial forum
for adjudicating disputes over takedown and put-back.
Our proposal is designed to be a modest first step in blazing a new
trail for the development of cybertort law. If the distributor with notice
rule applied to online stalking, for example, ISPs would have incentives
to create new authentication technologies and conduct audits of the
cyberstalker's Internet accounts and records of his online activities that
would be helpful in either a criminal prosecution or a civil action. A
robust cybertort regime will provide legal certainty by encouraging
content providers, online intermediaries, and ISPs to work together in
providing a safer Internet.
CONCLUSION
The rapid pace of technological change has exposed a fundamental
weakness in the American civil justice system. The present legal regime
of self-regulation by Internet stakeholders provides no favorable
remedies against ISPs for their direct negligence or for failing to prevent
crimes or torts against their customers. At present, the law of cybertorts
does not require ISPs to take down defamatory material, no matter how




injurious communications or mitigating ongoing tortious activities on
websites so long as third parties supplied the illegal content. No search
engine or service provider has a duty to disable fraudulent
advertisements, even if it has notice of crimes being committed through
its online sales websites.
The history of tort law is composed of landmark judicial decisions
that breached the citadel of regressive precedents. Just as many
common-law barricades to tort recovery were consigned to the ashbin of
history after World War I1,384 So must the judicially expanded § 230
obstructions to recovery be discarded. Imposing ISP liability for
notorious websites that harm the public interest reallocates some of the
costs of injury based on the least cost avoider principle. Today's
judiciary needs to be bolder in carving out cybertort duties to
compensate the victims of Internet crimes and torts.
Greater accountability in cyberspace should be achieved by restoring
the common law distinction between publishers and distributors, which
has been eradicated by recent court decisions construing § 230. Under
our online intermediary standard, ISPs and other intermediaries would
continue to enjoy immunity for conduit activities. However, they would
be subject to tort liability for third party crimes and torts under a
reinvigoration of the distributor standard for all Internet torts.
Congress should amend § 230 to faithfully reflect the need to balance
free expression with greater ISP accountability. This downsizing of the
entrenched CDA rule is only the first step toward developing a
negligence-based regime that will reduce the cost of injury in cyberspace
by imposing new duties on ISPs. A Department of Justice attorney
specializing in cybercrimes acknowledges that consumers have no real
protection from a wide variety of Internet misdeeds:
Benefiting from the confusion, many cyber-predators exploit
gaps in the law, test its limits, and hide behind conflicting
definitions of criminal activity. Identity predators, for example,
abuse lax information-sharing policies to commit identity fraud.
Cyberstalkers track their victims online, sending offensive e-
mails or menacing messages using Instant Messaging
technology. Spammers not only bombard users with unsolicited
384. Liability-limiting rules, defenses, and immunities "retreated like a melting glacier" in the
post-World War II period. Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A
Reinterpretation, in PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW 44, 68 (Robert L. Rabin ed., 2d ed. 1983). See
generally Rustad & Koenig, supra note 278 (discussing in depth expansion and contraction of tort
rights over course of U.S. history).
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junk e-mail, but can also spread destructive computer viruses-
like the SoBig.F virus-within messages that have misleading
subject lines.385
ISPs such as America Online are no longer delicate infants that need
absolute immunity in order to survive. Crafting new duties for ISPs will
restore the ability of tort law to go forward to mediate the new risks and
opportunities facing consumers in cyberspace.
i. Copyright infringement occurs when a defendant violates one of the exclusive rights of the
copyright holder. Id. § 50 1(a). A plaintiff can establish direct infringement by demonstrating that a
defendant used the copies in any of the ways described under 17 U.S.C. § 106, which include: (1)
reproduction of the copyrighted work; (2) preparation of derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work; (3) distribution of copies of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership; or (4) display of the copyrighted work publicly. Id. § 106. To be liable for
direct infringement, one must "actively engage in" and "directly cause" the copying. See generally
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Neteom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal.
1995). In contrast, contributory infringement requires proof of infringing activity and the
defendant's material contribution to the infringement. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp.
923, 932-33 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
ii. The E-Commerce Directive provides that:
Member States may establish obligations for information society service providers promptly to
inform the competent public authorities of alleged illegal activities undertaken or information
provided by recipients of their service or obligations to communicate to the competent
authorities, at their request, information enabling the identification of recipients of their service
with whom they have storage agreements.
E-Commerce Directive, supra note 27, at art. 15(2), at 12.
iii. The DMCA imposes no duty on the service provider but rather places the burden on the
copyright owner to monitor the Internet for potentially infringing sales. See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (a).
iv. Article 15 states that providers have no general obligation to monitor and prohibits member
states from enacting legislation requiring ISPs to monitor content. See E-Commerce Directive, supra
note 27, at art. 15(1), at 12 ("Member States shall not impose a general obligation on providers,
when providing the services covered by Articles 12, 13 and 14, to monitor the information which
they transmit or store, nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating
illegal activity.").
v. At present, no international treaty or entity governing the Internet has been established. As our
385. Harry A. Valetk, Mastering the Dark Arts of Cyberspace: A Quest for Sound Internet Safety
Policies, 2004 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 2, 8, available at http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/
04_STLR_2/articlepdf.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
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empirical study demonstrates, federal courts decide most U.S. Internet disputes and are the best-
qualified legal decisionmaker.
vi. Federal courts have jurisdiction to consider federal copyright claims. 17 U.S.C. § 512.
vii. Article 3(1) of the E-Commerce Directive requires that:
Each Member State shall ensure that the information society services provided by a service
provider established on its territory comply with the national provisions applicabl in the
Member State in question which fall within the coordinated field. (requirements laid down in
the national system applicable to Information Society service providers in the light of the
present Directive).
E-Commerce Directive, supra note 27, at art. 3(1), at 9; see EU Electronic Commerce Directive:
Jurisdictional Aspects, at http://www.smaldonado.com/marcos/docs/pi-di00_cl-eu-en.html (last
visited March 16, 2005); see also JuliA-Barcel6 & Koelman, supra note 289 (arguing that E-
Commerce Directive has not developed specific rules for implementing E-Commerce Directive).
Similarly, it is unclear how jurisdictional issues would function in this uncertain legal environment.
See generally Council Regulation 44/2001/EC of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1,
available at http://www.ip-firm.de/eugvue-e.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2005).
viii. The proposed regime adopts the same conduit immunity rule as implemented by the DMCA
and E-Commerce Directive. 17 U.S.C. § 512; E-commerce Directive, supra note 27, at art. 12-14 at
12-13.
ix. Section 512 of the DMCA, entitled "Limitations on Liability Relating to Material Online,"
immunizes service providers against monetary or injunctive actions for "transitory digital network
communications." 17 U.S.C. § 512(a). This section gives service providers immunity for the
transmission of material "initiated by or at the direction of a person other than the service provider"
so long as activities such as transmitting, routing or storing data are an "automatic response to the
request of another person." Id. § 512(a)(1), (3). There is no conduit immunity if the provider selects
recipients "except as an automatic response to the request of another person." Id. § 512(a)(3). A
provider is stripped of its immunity if it makes a copy of copyrighted material for a purpose other
than conduit activity. Id. § 512(a)(4). Similarly, there is no ISP liability for "system caching" that
arises out of either intermediate or temporary storage of material. Id. § 512(b)(1). All of these
conduit immunities are conditional on the assumption that the provider does not modify content. Id.
§ 512(a)(5), (b)(2). Finally, the ISP is not liable for information residing on systems or networks at
the direction of users. Id. § 512(c).
None of this immunity is available to service providers unless they comply with the DMCA safe
harbor provisions in § 512(b)(2). Providers must designate an agent "to receive notifications of
claimed infringement." Id. § 512(c)(2). Providers must make this information available both on their
websites and by providing the same information to the U.S. Copyright Office. Id. The specific
elements of notification require that the complainant provide "[a] physical or electronic signature of
a person authorized to act on behalf of the [copyright] owner allegedly infringed." Id.
§ 512(c)(3)(A)(i). A complainant also must identify the copyrighted work that is claimed to have
been infringed. Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii). The person or entity claiming that material is infringing must
give the ISP the necessary information to locate the objectionable material. Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii).
The person or entity initiating takedown must give a physical address, telephone number, and e-mail
address where they may be contacted. Id. § 512(c)(3)(B)(A)(iv). The complainant must attest to a
"good faith belief that use of the material" is not authorized. Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v). Finally, a
complainant who makes a bad-faith claim is subject to perjury. The complainant must attest to the
accuracy of the information in the takedown request. Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(vi). Section 512(g)(2)(E)
requires the service provider to "respond[] expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the
material that is claimed to be infringing upon notification of claimed infringement." Id.
§ 512(g)(2)(E). Accordingly, the DMCA, unlike the Directive, clarifies when ISPs are liable for
infringement.
x. Congress intended the DMCA's safe harbor for ISPs to be a floor, not a ceiling, of protection:
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Congress said nothing about whether passive ISPs should ever be held strictly liable as direct
infringers or whether plaintiffs suing 1SPs should instead proceed under contributory theories.
The DMCA has merely added a second step to assessing infringement liability for Internet
service providers, after it is determined whether they are infringers in the first place under the
preexisting Copyright Act. Thus, the DMCA is irrelevant to determining what constitutes a
prima facie case of copyright infringement.
CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 555 (4th Cir. 2004). "In order to enjoy the safe
harbor provided by §512(c), the ISP must also fulfill other conditions imposed by the DMCA." Id.
at 552 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(i)).
xi. Article 12 provides immunity for mere conduits:
1. Where an information society service is provided that consists of the transmission in a
communication network of information provided by a recipient of the service, or the provision
of access to a communication network, Member States shall ensure that the service provider is
not liable for the information transmitted, on condition that the provider:
(a) does not initiate the transmission;
(b) does not select the receiver of the transmission; and
(c) does not select or modify the information contained in the transmission.
2. The acts of transmission and of provision of access referred to in paragraph I include the
automatic, intermediate and transient storage of the information transmitted in so far as this
takes place for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission in the communication network,
and provided that the information is not stored for any period longer than is reasonably
necessary for the transmission.
3. This Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or administrative authority, in
accordance with Member States' legal systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or
prevent an infringement.
E-Commerce Directive, supra note 27, at art. 12, at 12-13.
xii. Id.
xiii. Article 13 of the E-Commerce Directive provides immunity for caching:
1. Where an information society service is provided that consists of the transmission in a
communication network of information provided by a recipient of the service, Member States
shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for the automatic, intermediate and temporary
storage of that information, performed for the sole purpose of making more efficient the
information's onward transmission to other recipients of the service upon their request, on
condition that: (a) the provider does not modify the information; (b) the provider complies with
conditions on access to the information; (c) the provider complies with rules regarding the
updating of the information, specified in a manner widely recognised and used by industry; (d)
the provider does not interfere with the lawful use of technology, widely recognised and used
by industry, to obtain data on the use of the information; and (e) the provider acts expeditiously
to remove or to disable access to the information it has stored upon obtaining actual knowledge
of the fact that the information at the initial source of the transmission has been removed from
the network, or access to it has been disabled, or that a court or an administrative authority has
ordered such removal or disablement.
2. This Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or administrative authority, in
accordance with Member States' legal systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or
prevent an infringement.
Id. at art. 13, at 13.
xiv. One unsettled question is where takedown requests should be submitted outside the realm of
infringement claims. We suggest making the U.S. Copyright Office the sole registration entity for
all objectionable content because its staff is familiar with the detailed procedures of the DMCA that
need be only slightly modified for torts and crimes. For example, the language about ISP Liability
Safe Harbors in § 512 can be easily adapted from infringement to defamation. The same rules
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immunizing ISPs for passive transmissions, cached copies, user-stored information, information and
information location tools apply irrespective of whether the objectionable conduct is infringing or
tortious. The DMCA rule that immunizes ISPs takedown activities where they are in good-faith
compliance with prescribed procedures is a good model to adapt for torts and other illegal activity.
The DMCA's rules on repeat infringers should also be extended to recidivist tortfeasors such as the
fraudulent seller in our Yahoo! Example, as well as ongoing defamers or invaders of privacy.
xv. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2).
xvi. See generally E-Commerce Directive, supra note 27.
xvii. The proposed ISP regime requires that complainants provide verifiable contact information
as well as a notice containing evidence of infringing, tortious or criminal activities. The DMCA
takedown regime requires the complainant to provide his or her name, address, and electronic
signature. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). In addition, our proposal requires more detailed information on
the nature of the tort or infringement.
xviii. The "actual notice" requirement is designed to protect ISPs from having a de facto duty to
monitor or screen content, thus balancing liability concerns with the First Amendment.
xix. The DMCA's takedown procedure applies only if the ISP has actual notice. Section
512(b)(2)(E) imposes the duty to remove or block access only if:
(i) the material has previously been removed from the originating site or access to it has been
disabled, or a court has ordered that the material be removed from the originating site or that
access to the material on the originating site be disabled; and (ii) the party giving the
notification includes in the notification a statement confirming that the material has been
removed from the originating site or access to it has been disabled or that a court has ordered
that the material be removed from the originating site or that access to the material on the
originating site be disabled.
17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(2)(E). Section 512(c)(3) requires that the accusing party identify the copyrighted
work claimed to have been infringed, or, if multiple copyrighted works at a single online site are
covered by a single notification, provide a representative list of such works at that site. The
notification must contain a statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and, under
penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an
exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(vi).
xx. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i).
xxi. See E-Commerce Directive, supra note 27, at art. 14, at 13 (noting obligation of provider,
"upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, [to act] expeditiously to remove or to disable access
to the information"); see also id. at art. 14(3), at 13 (stating that Article 14 "shall not affect the
possibility for a court or administrative authority, in accordance with Member States' legal systems,
of requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement, nor does it affect the
possibility for Member States of establishing procedures governing the removal or disabling of
access to information").
xxii. Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive expressly states there is no duty to monitor content,
so it is unclear what factual circumstances would constitute constructive notice. Id. at art. 15, at 13.
Unfortunately, there is no case law and little by way of commentary on specifics of this regime.
xxiii. This procedure mirrors the DMCA rule that ISPs must "designate[] an agent to receive
notifications of claimed infringement" of their intellectual property rights." 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2).
In addition, ISPs are required to file the appointed agent's name, address and other contact
information with the U.S. Copyright Office. Id. Finally, this information must be posted
prominently on the ISP's services. Id. Congress could, at its discretion, make the Copyright Office
the designated repository for appointed agents covering areas beyond copyright infringement. The
U.S. Copyright Office has a mechanism for registering agents that could easily be adapted to
complaints for other intellectual property infringement, ongoing torts, crimes or other illegal
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materials. It would be desirable for one government entity to handle all agent registrations. Id.
§ 512(c). The U.S. Copyright Office maintains a website list of all service providers who have filed
designations of agents for notification of claims of infringement pursuant to § 512(c) of the
Copyright Act. Directory of Service Provider Agents for Notification of Claims of Infringement, at
http://www.copyright.gov/onlinesp/list/index.html (last visited March 20, 2005).
xxiv. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2).
xxv. Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iv).
xxvi . The DMCA provides requirements for proper notification of possible copyright
infringements in 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A).
xxvii. Section 512(f) of the DMCA establishes civil liability when someone materially
misrepresents to an ISP that information posted is infringing. The statute states:
Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this section-
(1) that material or activity is infringing, or
(2) that material or activity was removed or disabled by mistake or misidentification,
shall be liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, incurred by the alleged
infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner's authorized licensee, or by a service
provider, who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of the service provider relying
upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the material or activity claimed
to be infringing, or in replacing the removed material or ceasing to disable access to it.
17 U.S.C. § 512(f). While explicit civil liability is assessed against those who make
misrepresentations to the ISP, there is no mention of whether the ISP may be liable for bad faith
takedowns of material that proves not to be infringing.
xxviii. There is no specific provision for monetary or injunctive relief in the E-Commerce
Directive. It is unclear whether individual European countries would provide private causes of
action to enforce the Directive.
xxix. Section 512(0 of the DMCA permits a content creator to recoup damages caused by
wrongful takedowns. If the content creator proves that the takedown request was made using
material misrepresentations, it will have a claim for
damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, incurred by the alleged infringer, by any
copyright owner or copyright owner's authorized licensee, or by a service provider, who is
injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of the service provider relying upon such
misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the material or activity claimed to be
infringing, or in replacing the removed material or ceasing to disable access to it.
17 U.S.C. § 512(f). See LEE A. HOLLAAR, LEGAL PROTECTION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, ch.
III.B.3 (2002), available at http://digital-law-online.info/lpdil1.0/treatise34.html (last visited Apr. 29,
2005).
xxx. One commentator has stated that:
the question arises whether Internet service providers are liable for infringing material posted
by users on their server. Infringing material could be for example, defamatory material,
material in breach of copyright, material breaching criminal law (e.g. communications relating
to criminal activities such as drug dealing; statements inciting racial hatred, child pornographic
material). This involves problematic issues as to the enforcement of public law regulation
against obscenity, the expression of racial hatred[,] etc.
Julia Hrmle, The European Union Takes Initiative in the Field of E-Commerce, J. INFO. L. & TECH,
pt. 3.9 (Issue Three) (2000), available at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/
elj/jilt/2000_3/hornle.
